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ABSTRACT
Corporate law is undergoing an explosion of governance by private
ordering. With increasing frequency and creativity, the charter and
bylaws of public corporations are being used as tools for restructur-
ing key aspects of corporate governance. The current focus of parties,
courts, and scholars has been on the facial validity of these efforts.
In light of courts’ willingness to uphold corporate governance
contracting, legal battles will morph from validity challenges to
interpretation disputes. Yet interpretation principles are a topic to
which corporate scholars have devoted limited attention. With
interpretation poised to take on an influential role in shaping
corporate law and norms, establishing a cohesive interpretative
framework is critical.
This Article rejects the contract metaphor traditionally applied to
questions of charter and bylaw interpretation in favor of a more
nuanced interpretative framework. Dissecting the provisions that
comprise a public corporation’s organizational documents reveals a
rich combination of standardization, customization, and innovation.
Drawing from many sides of traditional interpretation debates, this
Article links the different types of organizational provisions to the
interpretive theory and principles that most accurately achieve the
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primary interpretive goals attendant to each. The outcome is a
framework that requires courts to engage in a more explicit and
tailored analysis, resulting in a stable interpretation scheme and
clear judicial guidance to market actors.
2019] INTERPRETING ORGANIZATIONAL “CONTRACTS” 987
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
I. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS. . . . . 992
II. ORGANIZATIONAL “CONTRACTS” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005
A. The Contract Metaphor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007
B. A Unique “Contractual” Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
III. INTERPRETING ORGANIZATIONAL “CONTRACTS” . . . . . . . . . 1017
A. An Interpretation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
1. Technical, Statutorily Mandated Language . . . . . . . . 1021
2. Fundamental Corporate Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
3. Organizational “Boilerplate”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029
4. Novel Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
5. Individually Negotiated Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
B. Benefits of an Explicit Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
988 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:985
“With the evolving role of bylaws, these are very interesting times
in Delaware corporate jurisprudence and in corporate gover-
nance.” 1
—The Honorable Henry duPont Ridgley, Justice, Supreme Court
of Delaware
INTRODUCTION
Public corporations are in the midst of an explosion of governance
by private ordering.2 With increasing frequency and creativity, the
certificate of incorporation and bylaws of public corporations are
being used as tools for restructuring key aspects of corporate gov-
ernance. Forum selection, fee-shifting, arbitration, proxy access, and
proxy reimbursement provisions are some recent examples of the
emerging role and use of organizational documents as a platform for
ex ante corporate governance.3 Currently, the Delaware courts have
indicated a permissive attitude toward corporate governance con-
tracting, citing to the corporate contract metaphor.4 These decisions
have further fueled the private ordering movement and corporate
governance initiatives, emphasizing ex ante tactics and innovations
through amendments to the charter and bylaws.5
1. Henry duPont Ridgely, The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate Governance, 68
SMU L. REV. 317, 330 (2015).
2. Consistent with prior scholarship addressing this topic, this Article uses the term
“private ordering” to mean contractual in nature. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and
the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2016) (“[F]or the most part
the innovations take the form of private ordering—that is, the adoption of issuer-specific rules
that are contractual in nature (as opposed to statutes, agency rules, or decisional law).”); D.
Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127
n.12 (2011).
3. Jill Fisch uses the term “new governance” to describe the rise of private ordering in
organizational documents to structure governance rights. Fisch, supra note 2, at 1638-39.
4. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 257, 258 (2015) (“Boilermakers and ATP Tour each reasoned from the perspective that
the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation, and in turn their relationship with the
board of directors, are contractual so that much of the shareholders’ rights can be understood
to flow from certain organic documents, and most significantly and pervasively from the
company’s bylaws.”). But see Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL, slip op. at 49
(Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018) (invalidating federal forum charter provisions).
5. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, CONFERENCE BD. GOVERNANCE CTR. TRENDS IN EXCLUSIVE
FORUM BYLAWS 3 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411715 [https:
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There is a growing body of scholarship focusing on the private
ordering of public corporate governance, ranging from narrow dis-
cussions of the legality of individual provisions to broader discus-
sions of the normative value of ex ante corporate contracting, the
legitimacy of the contract metaphor in corporate law, and stock-
holder empowerment.6 This Article moves past current discourse to
address the next logical issue in the corporate contracting saga—
interpretation of the provisions.7 Given that there is no indication
of a judicial reversal on the ability to engage in ex ante corporate
governance planning and every indication that the corporate con-
tracting trend will persist, legal battles will naturally morph from
validity challenges to interpretation disputes. Interpretation prin-
ciples, as applied to organizational documents, will thus become
significant in a way that they have not been in the past. In anticipa-
tion of the growing importance of charter and bylaw interpretation,
this Article proposes a cohesive interpretive framework for organiza-
tional documents with the goal of providing clarity to an area of the
law that has, to date, largely been overlooked. 
Since the early nineteenth century, the corporation has been the-
orized and discussed in contractarian terms. Courts and scholars
describe the charter and bylaws as contracts (1) between the State
//perma.cc/5TF2-F88N] (reporting on the announcement or adoption of forum selection
provisions post-Boilermakers); Alison Frankel, Sneaky New Trend in IPOs: Make Shareholders
Pay if They Sue and Lose, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/
2014/10/09/sneaky-new-trend-in-ipos-make-shareholders-pay-if-they-sue-and-lose/ [https://
perma.cc/5J9V-HH5P] (reporting on the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws in the wake of ATP
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund); Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholders, Disarmed by a
Delaware Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/business/
shareholders-disarmed-by-a-delaware-court.html [https://perma.cc/V2M9-GAD7]; see also
Transcript of Oral Ruling at 9-10, 13, Edgen Grp. v. Genoud, No. 9055-VCL, 2013 WL 6409517
(Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013); Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an
Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269, 286 (2015); George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance,
41 J. CORP. L. 609, 639 (2016); Ridgely, supra note 1, at 330.
6. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Geeyoung Min, Contractarian Theory and Unilateral Bylaw
Amendments, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2018); Cox, supra note 4, at 258; Fisch, supra note 2,
at 1640-41; Geis, supra note 5, at 639; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 127, 130; Verity Winship,
Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 491 n.25 (2016). 
7. This Article adopts the following description of “interpretation”: “Contract
interpretation is the undertaking by a judge or jury (or an arbitrator ... ) to figure out what
the terms of a contract are, or should be understood to be. It should be distinguished from
simple enforcement.” Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2005) (internal citation omitted). 
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and the corporation, (2) between the corporation and its stockhold-
ers, and (3) among a corporation’s stockholders.8 Relying on the
contract metaphor, Delaware courts have repeatedly held that,
when interpreting an entity’s organizational documents, “general
rules of contract interpretation apply to [their] terms.”9 Importing
contract principles to resolve questions of interpretation involving
the charter and bylaws is, however, problematic. Organizational
documents and contracts are not mirror images. The contract meta-
phor fails to account for the unique mix of standardized, innovative,
and customized terms that comprise organizational documents.10
Moreover, the charter and bylaws implicate both private and public
law in a way that traditional contracts do not, demanding different
interpretation considerations and goals.11 Organizational documents
are instead distinctive contract-like institutions that trigger their
own distinctive interpretation concerns.
 Despite these differences, the charter and bylaws are identical to
all contracts in one important respect: they are the product of hu-
man effort and, as such, are subject to behavioral bias, mistake, and
ambiguity. As former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court,
E. Norman Veasey, and Jane Simon nicely summarize: “It is a rare
contract that needs absolutely no interpretation. Scriveners are not
perfect, the English language can be tricky, and the future of the
application of contract language cannot be unfailingly predicted at
the time and in the circumstances of the negotiation.”12 Thus, not
8. See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010); Centaur
Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990). 
9. Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Del. 1990); see also Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at
1188. “Indeed, the certificate of incorporation, if it needs to be interpreted, is construed as a
contract.” 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 1.3, 1-5 n.17 (3d ed. 2018) (citing Berlin v. Emerald
Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 488 (Del. 1988); Ellingwood v. Wolf ’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743
(Del. 1944)); see also Centaur Partners, 582 A.2d at 928.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate
“Contracts,” 93 WASH. L. REV. 265, 268 (2018) (“But a corporation’s charter and bylaws are no
ordinary contracts. Rather, they are hybrid legal structures that provide a mechanism for
collective choice in the context of substantial state regulation and straddle the public-private
divide in ways that make them quite dissimilar from ordinary contracts.”); cf. Marcel Kahan
& Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The
Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 716 (1997).
12. E. Norman Veasey & Jane M. Simon, The Conundrum of When Delaware Contract
Law Will Allow Evidence Outside the Contract’s “Four Corners” in Construing an Un-
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surprisingly, interpretation issues remain “the largest single source
of contract litigation between business firms.”13 Yet, attention to
interpretation principles has, to date, been scarce.14 The dominance
of the contractarian view of the corporation has overshadowed
charter and bylaw interpretation, masking the need for meaningful
discourse and examination in this area of the law. With interpreta-
tion poised to take on an influential role in shaping corporate law
and norms, this deficiency can no longer be ignored; establishing a
cohesive interpretative framework for organizational documents is
critical.
This Article addresses the absence of a more nuanced and com-
prehensive interpretive framework for organizational documents.
Dissecting the provisions that comprise a public corporation’s or-
ganizational documents, the proposed framework requires courts
first to classify the provision at issue as falling into one of five
categories: (1) technical, statutorily mandated language, (2) funda-
mental corporate rights, (3) organizational “boilerplate,” (4) novel
provisions, or (5) individually negotiated provisions. Recognizing
that each category elicits different policy concerns and interpretive
goals, the framework then links an appropriate interpretation the-
ory and its principles—textual, contextual, or statutory—to that cat-
egory. The framework encourages courts to explicitly recognize the
different parts of a charter or bylaws and the different interpre-
tation considerations attendant to each. Adopting this framework
has the benefit of communicating to the corporate community and
other courts a clear interpretive scheme for organizational docu-
ments and obliges courts to explain when they depart from that
scheme. The framework also provides flexibility and discretion for
courts to engage in the type of case-by-case analysis that is a
hallmark of corporate law.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I outlines the
evolving role of organizational documents in corporate law. In par-
ticular, it describes the private ordering trend in public corporation
ambiguous Contractual Provision, 72 BUS. LAW. 893, 895 (2017).
13. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926,
928 (2010).
14. Cf. Posner, supra note 7, at 1581; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 928 (asserting
that scholarly commentary on contract interpretation is unhelpful and scarce).
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governance. In recent years, stockholders have looked to become
more active participants in corporate affairs through bylaw amend-
ments.15 In reply, boards of directors have pushed back by exploring
avenues of limiting stockholders’ rights in organizational pro-
visions.16 In adjudicating the enforceability of governance provi-
sions, the Delaware courts have used strong language embracing
contractual rhetoric in describing the charter and bylaws.17 Part II
provides the background for the contract metaphor frequently cited
in deciding questions of charter and bylaw enforceability and
interpretation then addresses why it is incorrect to transform or-
ganizational documents into contracts for interpretation analyses.
Part III proposes a tailored interpretive framework for organiza-
tional documents by examining the unique makeup of the charter
and bylaws. The framework provides for a two-step approach to
resolving charter and bylaw interpretation disputes. Examples of
the application of the framework are provided, as well as a discus-
sion of the benefits and normative value of an explicit interpreta-
tion scheme.
I. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS
Organizational documents provide for the governance of a busi-
ness entity and its participants. In the corporate context, the orga-
nizational documents are the certificate of incorporation (frequently
referred to as the “charter”)18 and the bylaws.19 The charter is the
more formal, publicly filed document that initiates a corporation’s
legal existence.20 The courts have described the charter’s role as
defining “the broad and general aspects of the corporate entity’s
15. See Smith, supra note 2, at 131-33.
16. Cf. id. at 134-37.
17. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
18. Depending on the jurisdiction, the initial formation document may be referred to as
the certificate of incorporation (e.g., in Delaware) or the articles of incorporation (e.g., in a
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) jurisdiction). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1954).
19. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06.
20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1954). The charter is typically filed with the Secretary of State. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 2.03(b).
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existence and nature.”21 A charter is a combination of mandatory
and permissive provisions.22 All state corporate statutes require
certain information to be included in every corporate charter filed
in their jurisdiction.23 There is some slight variation among states
in the statutorily required provisions; nevertheless, certain re-
quirements are universal: name of the corporation, name and
address of the registered agent, name(s) and address(es) of the
incorporator(s), and certain information regarding the capitalization
of the corporation.24 One provision not required by statute, but
present in virtually every corporate charter, is a provision exculpat-
ing directors for duty of care violations.25 Beyond this, a charter may
contain any provision not inconsistent with law.26 After a corpora-
tion issues stock, amendments to the charter must follow a formal
process provided by statute, requiring approval of both the board of
directors and the stockholders and a formal filing with the state.27
The other required corporate organizational document is the
bylaws. The bylaws are not publicly filed with the state of incorpora-
tion and have been “characterized as the proper place to set forth
‘the self-imposed rules and regulations deemed expedient for ... the
... convenient functioning’ of the corporation.”28 The bylaws provide
21. Gow v. Consol. Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933). 
22. See infra note 23.
23. The provisions in a charter can be divided into four broad categories: (1) statutorily
required provisions, (2) optional provisions that if a corporation chooses to include must be
in the charter, (3) optional provisions that may be included in the bylaws or the charter, and
(4) any other provision not inconsistent with Delaware law. See tit. 8, § 102(a)-(b) (2015).
24. See, e.g., id. § 102(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(a) (1954). For example, in
Delaware, the purpose of the corporation, as well as the name(s) and address(es) of the initial
board of directors (if the powers of the incorporate terminate upon filing) are also required to
be included in the charter. See tit. 8, § 102(a).
25. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4).
26. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(1); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b).
27. See tit. 8, § 242(a)-(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03. One exception to this
requirement is the board of directors’ ability to unilaterally authorize series of preferred stock.
See tit. 8, §§ 104, 151(g) (providing for certificates of designation, which are amendments to
the charter). This power (typically called “blank check authority”) must, however, be provided
to the board in the charter. See id. § 102(a)(4).
28. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.10, 1-16 (quoting Gow v. Consol.
Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933)). See also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps.
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008) (describing bylaws as “procedural” and “process-
oriented”); Ridgely, supra note 1, at 317 (“In each organization, there needed to be rules
defining the organization’s membership, purpose, and means of selecting its leaders. The
creation and adoption of bylaws grew out of this need.”). While bylaws are considered a
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for the internal governance of the corporation with, for example,
provisions addressing meetings of stockholders and of directors;29
the number of directors on the board;30 director resignations,31 re-
movals,32 and filling vacancies;33 establishing corporate officers and
their duties;34 and indemnification and advancement rights.35 To the
extent they conflict, the bylaws are subordinate to the charter and
the law (state statutes, common law, and federal laws).36 However,
“by-laws are presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the
bylaws in a manner consistent with the law [and the charter] rather
than strike down the bylaws.”37 In contrast to the charter, either the
stockholders or the board of directors may unilaterally amend the
bylaws.38 Bylaws may also be waived or amended formally (for
example, by vote) or informally (for example, by conduct or implica-
tion), with the latter being less common.39
nonpublic document under state law, publicly traded corporations must publicly file their
bylaws pursuant to federal securities law and the rules of stock exchanges. See ATP Tour, Inc.
v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014). 
29. See tit. 8, §§ 211, 216 (2009).
30. See id. § 141(b) (2016).
31. See id.
32. See id. § 141(k) (2016).
33. See id. § 223(a) (2016).
34. See id. § 142 (2016).
35. See id. § 145(a) (2011).
36. See id. § 109(b) (2015) (stating that the bylaws may include any provision consistent
with the charter and law); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 458 n.6 (Del. 1991) (“[A] cor-
poration’s bylaws may never contradict its certificate of incorporation.”). However, bylaws are
viewed as superior to board resolutions. See Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080
(Del. Ch. 2004), aff ’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005). 
37. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985); see also ATP
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014) (quoting Frantz).
38. See tit. 8, § 109(a) (2015). The stockholders’ ability to amend the bylaws is immutable.
On the other hand, under Delaware law the board only has the ability to amend the bylaws
if such power is provided for in the charter. See id. Under the MBCA, directors have the power
to amend the bylaws unless the charter divests them of that right. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 10.20(b).
39. See tit. 8, § 109(a); Russel v. Morris, No. 10009, 1990 WL 15618, at *5 (Del. Ch. 1990)
(stating that the court “does not easily recognize the amendment of a corporation’s bylaws by
implication”); In re Ivey & Ellington, Inc., 42 A.2d 508, 509 (Del. Ch. 1945) (“[A] corporate by-
law may be amended by implication and without any formal action being taken by clear proof
of a definite and uniform custom or usage, not in accord with the by-laws regularly adopted,
and by acquiescence therein.”); Star Loan Ass’n v. Moore, 55 A. 946, 948 (Del. Super. Ct. 1903)
(“[B]y-laws may be adopted without the use of the corporate seal, and no entry in writing is
necessary.”); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.10, 1-22 (“In rare instances, the
existence of a by-law may be established either by custom, or by acquiescence. Similarly, by-
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Collectively, a corporation’s organizational documents contain a
combination of legally required provisions and tailored provisions
chosen by the incorporator, board of directors, and/or stockholders.
The Delaware statute contemplates a large amount of leeway in
crafting the charter and bylaws.40 As explained by the Delaware
Supreme Court, “[section 102(b)(1)] confers, in the most general
language, the right to include in a certificate of incorporation any
provision deemed appropriate for the conduct of the corporate
affairs.”41 Similarly, section 109(b) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) states that “[t]he bylaws may contain any
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”42 The only
restriction on this freedom of design is that a provision cannot be
contrary to statute or general law.43 Yet even this limitation has
been interpreted by the courts as allowing charter provisions that
laws may be amended by implication.” (internal citation omitted)).
40. This Article largely focuses on Delaware law, which has been widely recognized as the
preeminent source of corporate law. See William T. Allen, The Pride and Hope for Delaware
Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 70, 71 (2000) (stating that Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL) “is certainly the nation’s and indeed the world’s leading organization law for
large scale business enterprise”); William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware
Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351,
354 (1992) (“Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the expertise of the
Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the century, it has handed down thousands
of opinions interpreting virtually every provision of Delaware’s corporate law statute. No
other state court can make such a claim.”); David Skeel, The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware
Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2017) (“Delaware does indeed have a dominant position in
corporate law. Roughly 60 percent of the largest corporations are incorporated in Delaware,
and more than 80 percent of corporations that choose a state of incorporation outside their
home state choose Delaware.”); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and
Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1760 (2004) (describing why
Delaware is the “country’s most important corporate law jurisdiction”).
41. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117 (Del. 1952) (emphasis added).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015) (emphasis added). Recently, the Delaware Court
of Chancery ruled that private ordering in a corporation’s organizational documents could
only reach the internal affairs of the corporation and could not regulate the forum of suits over
external matters. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL, slip op. at 2, 5, 45
(Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
43. See tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(1), 109(b); Sagusa, Inc. v. Magellan Petroleum Corp., No. 12,977,
1993 WL 512487, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 1993), aff ’d, 650 A.2d 1306 (Del. 1994); see also
EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 109.05[A],
1-94 (6th ed. 2018). 
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vary the common law and statutory default rules so long as they do
not “achieve a result forbidden by settled rules of public policy.”44 In
sum, absent a direct conflict with the law, courts have generally
upheld organizational provisions so long as they are reasonable and
equitable.45
Seizing on the enabling nature of corporate law, stockholders
and boards of public corporations are increasingly using organiza-
tional documents as a vehicle for reshaping the balance of power in
corporate governance. Historically, close corporations46 and unin-
corporated entities (for example, limited liability companies (LLCs)
and partnerships)47 were the primary entities employing contractual
governance mechanisms in their organizational documents to spe-
cifically tailor the respective rights and powers of the entity and its
constituents. In contrast, contractual corporate governance in the
public corporate context was more limited, occurring in stockholders
agreements, preferred stock designations, debt instruments, and
commercial and consumer contracts.48 Today, however, public
44. Sterling, 93 A.2d at 118.
45. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985); Schnell v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); WELCH ET AL., supra note 43, at § 109.06, 1-
97; Ridgely, supra note 1, at 321 (“Director qualification bylaws will be struck down only when
they are enacted for an inequitable purpose, in violation of Delaware law, or are unreasonable
or arbitrary.”).
46. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 127-28 (“Shareholders in closely held corporations
routinely use private ordering in the form of shareholder agreements and other contractual
arrangements to impose order on the business of the corporation and to regulate the conduct
of its affairs.” (internal citation omitted)); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First,
Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 56-57 (2013) (describing close corporations
such as LLCs as contractual entities). 
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (2010) (“It is the policy of [the Limited Part-
nership Act] to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the en-
forceability of partnership agreements.”); id. § 18-1101(b) (2013) (“It is the policy of [the LLC
Act] to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari,
727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) (“The Delaware [LLC] Act has been modeled on the popular
Delaware LP Act.... The policy of freedom of contract underlies both the [LLC] Act and the LP
Act.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Mark Lowenstein & Robert Hillman eds., 2014).
48. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 1637, 1642-43 (describing “old governance” devices); see also
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1815, 1839, 1847 (2013) (describing the rights preferred stockholders can secure through the
terms of preferred stock designations); Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and
Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 707-
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corporations’ boards and stockholders alike are testing the bounds
of the freedom to contract in the organizational documents. Charter
and bylaw provisions are being added with increasing fervor that
attempt to shape key aspects of corporate governance ex ante and
shift the distribution of rights and power in the corporation.49
As a brief aside, the enabling nature of Delaware law that allows
for the private ordering of corporate governance in organizational
documents is not new. As Easterbrook and Fishel point out in their
1989 article “The Corporate Contract”:
The corporate code in almost every state is an “enabling”
statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to
write their own tickets, to establish systems of governance
without substantive scrutiny from a regulator and without
effective restraint on the permissible methods of corporate
governance.... [F]or equity investors, almost everything is open
to choice.50
09 (2008) (discussing the ability of debt instruments to be used as levers of control over
corporate governance).
49. See Geis, supra note 5, at 610-11 (“Increasingly, however, shareholders and managers
are emphasizing tactics that move from ex-post response to ex-ante planning.”); Ridgely, supra
note 1, at 330 (discussing the emerging role of bylaws as a corporate governance tool);
Winship, supra note 6, at 521-22 (describing corporate contract procedure as an emerging
distinctive legal phenomenon).
Illustrating the emergence of private ordering in organizational documents, in 2015, proxy
advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis included charter and bylaw provisions that impacted
litigation rights as a separate category in their voting guidance to investors. See GLASS,
LEWIS, & CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY SEASON: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS
LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE 39-40 (2014), http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/
2013/12/2015_GUIDELINES_United_States.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ37-QHF4];
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2015 BENCHMARK
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 23-24 (2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015us
summaryvotingguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KHW-8CGK] (“Generally vote against bylaws
that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits.”).
50. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1417-18 (1989); see also Ridgely, supra note 1, at 330 (“[T]he advantage of the DGCL
is its enabling nature and the ability it gives for private ordering subject to the fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty.”); Smith et al., supra note 2, at 140 (“Delaware is typically
portrayed as the defender of private ordering. The law of Delaware is said to be ‘enabling,’ not
‘regulatory.’” (internal citation omitted)); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do
Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
673, 674 (2005) (describing Delaware law as “enabling” in nature).
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This fact then raises the question, why now? What has changed in
corporate law to spur the private ordering movement in public
corporations?
Several factors are likely contributors. First is the rise of insti-
tutional investor activism. As ownership of public corporations
becomes concentrated in institutional investors, these large stock-
holders have the clout and ability to overcome the collective action
and rational apathy problems traditionally cited as limiting stock-
holder participation in corporate affairs.51 In recent decades, certain
institutional investors—namely public pension funds, labor unions,
and hedge funds—have sought to become more active participants
in the corporation.52 These stockholders are looking to expand the
tools available to them to constrain management power, including,
among other tactics, amending the bylaws to impact corporate gov-
ernance procedures.53 Of course, as stockholders flex their muscles
to increase their participation, boards of directors push back by
exploring avenues of limiting stockholders’ rights.54 This push and
51. See CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 213-15, 223 (6th ed. 2010) (discussing the collective action and
rational apathy problems facing public stockholders and noting the “unprecedented growth
in activism and institutional shareholders” which has compensated for some of these
problems); William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 860-61 (2001); Jill E. Fisch,
Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962-63
(2010); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 863 (2013)
(“Equity ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of
the canonical Berle-Means firm.”).
52. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 214; Fisch, supra note 2, at 1643-44
(“[I]t is clear that, in the United States, shareholders are more active and effective in
corporate governance than ever before.”); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 51, at 867-68
(describing the interplay of institutional and activist stockholders in influencing corporate
governance); Smith et al., supra note 2, at 171-72. 
53. See Geis, supra note 5, at 644 (“Shareholder-side initiatives, including board
declassification campaigns and other activist proposals, have blossomed in recent years.”);
Smith et al., supra note 2, at 171-72 (“In recent years, as institutional investors have shown
an increased inclination toward participation in corporate governance, the monitoring role of
shareholders has focused on director elections. In addition to proxy access, discussed above,
shareholders have created various other means of making director elections more meaningful,
including withhold-the-vote campaigns, majority voting, and the abolition of cumulative
voting and classified boards.”).
54. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 134-37 (discussing opposition to shareholder
empowerment).
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pull for power in managing the corporation is reflected in ex ante
corporate governance initiatives.55 
Another more limited contributor to the rise in ex ante corporate
governance is the influence of alternative entity jurisprudence and
experimentation with such entities’ near absolute freedom to con-
tract. The statutes authorizing alternative entities such as LLCs
and limited partnerships (LPs) “declare as public policy the goal of
granting the broadest contractual freedom possible, and permit the
parties to the governing instrument to waive any of the statutory or
common law default principles of law and to shape their own
relationships.”56 In recent years, parties in publicly traded alterna-
tive entities have sought to eliminate bedrock protections, such as
the duty of loyalty, in their organizational documents and “fully util-
ize the expansive contractual freedom authorized by alternative
entity statutes to grant managerial discretion.”57 And, when chal-
lenged, the Delaware courts have upheld such provisions as enforce-
able.58 As two prominent Delaware jurists point out, however, the
freedom to contract in the organizational documents of alternative
55. See Geis, supra note 5, at 639, 644-45 (describing different current and potential
future shareholder-side and management-side initiatives). The optimal balance of power
between stockholders and managers in managing the corporation and the accountability
mechanisms that accompany such power and control is a central problem in corporate law.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 559, 567-68 (2008); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of
One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 993 (2003) (“One of the central problems of corporate
law has always been how to create a system whereby diffuse stockholders feel comfortable
entrusting their capital to centralized management.”); Report of the Task Force of the ABA
Section of Business Law Corporate Governance Committee on Delineation of Governance Roles
and Responsibilities, 65 BUS. LAW. 107, 110 (2009) (“Maintaining an appropriate balance
between responsibilities for corporate oversight and decision-making is critical to the corpo-
ration’s capacity to serve as engine of economic growth, job creation, and innovation.”).
56. Strine & Laster, supra note 47, at 11; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (2010)
(“It is the policy of [the Limited Partnership Act] to give maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.”); id. § 18-1101(b) (“It
is the policy of [the LLC Act] to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract
and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”).
57. Strine & Laster, supra note 47, at 12; see also Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private
Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in Delaware Non-Corporate Business Associations,
38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 57-58 (2013); Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware
Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 561-
62 (2012).
58. See Gerber v. Enterprise Prods. Holdings, LLC, No. 5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at
*13-14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012).
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entities is not substantially different than that afforded to partici-
pants in the corporate enterprise.59 Thus, experimentation with gov-
ernance in alternative entity organizational documents, combined
with judicial validation of those provisions and the reiteration of the
contractual nature of organizational documents, may have influ-
enced similar experimentation in public corporations.
Recent judicial rulings have also been cited as contributing to the
upsurge in ex ante corporate governance provisions. In her research
on litigation procedure bylaws, Professor Verity Winship explains
that as the courts signaled an increasing acceptance and willing-
ness to enforce provisions governing litigation procedure in commer-
cial and consumer contracts, parties became more comfortable with
adopting parallel provisions in organizational documents.60 In a
similar vein, Professor George Geis points out that as Delaware
courts reiterate and reinforce the idea that charters and bylaws are
contracts, corporate actors become more confident that private
ordering amendments will be upheld, triggering further develop-
ments and proposals to include ex ante corporate governance fea-
tures in organizational documents.61
The predominant venue for ex ante corporate governance in
organizational documents has been the bylaws.62 As a practical
59. See Strine & Laster, supra note 47, at 17, 22 (calling the contractual flexibility
motivation cited for preferring alternative entities to the corporate form a “canard”). But see
Cox, supra note 4, at 282-83 (“The juxtaposition of LLC statutes with general corporation
statutes not only invites but also confirms the conclusion that a clear distinction exists
between the two with respect to the embrace of private ordering. Whereas the LLC enjoys few
private-ordering restrictions, corporate law provides a body of predictable mandatory rules
and no open-ended invitation for their alteration. While less freedom for private ordering
exists within the corporate statute, corporate statutes’ greater rigidity through more
standardized terms has social significance by reducing information costs for market parti-
cipants as well as reducing legal uncertainty.”).
60. See Winship, supra note 6, at 498-99 (discussing the backdrop of contract procedure
and how it contributed to the emergence of litigation provisions in corporate organizational
documents).
61. See Geis, supra note 5, at 644-45 (“One clear driver of these initiatives is a renewed
emphasis on corporate bylaws as contracts. By conceptualizing the corporate relationship as
an unfolding agreement between shareholders and firms, lawmakers can view bylaw
modification efforts as the permissible product of flexible private ordering.”).
62. See generally Choi & Min, supra note 6 (describing developments in using bylaws to
provide for corporate governance rights); see also Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The
Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 595-98
(2016); Ridgely, supra note 1, 317, 319-20 (discussing the emerging use of bylaws to provide
for corporate governance).
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matter, the bylaws are the more attractive place for testing the
limits of contractual corporate governance. First, the bylaws may be
unilaterally amended by the stockholders and, at almost all public
corporations, the board.63 There are only narrow restrictions on the
power of stockholders or directors to amend the bylaws,64 and each
group may amend the bylaws despite the opposition of the other.65
Thus, in comparison to the charter—which requires both board and
stockholder approval and, unless altered in the governing docu-
ments, a higher vote standard for stockholder approval—it is easier
and faster to amend the bylaws.66 Second, the fallout from an
aggressive bylaw provision, calling into question the validity of the
bylaws in their entirety, does not threaten the corporate existence
the way invalidation of a corporate charter would.67
Picking up on the latitude expressed in the statute, as well as the
ease with which bylaws can be amended, the focus of recent at-
tempts at ex ante governance has been the private ordering of
stockholder litigation in the bylaws. This trend has involved boards
limiting stockholder litigation through forum-selection bylaws,
63. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2018).
64. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008) (holding
that "the shareholders' statutory power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws is not coextensive
with the board's concurrent power" under Section 141(a) and that there could be times where
a stockholder bylaw would be an invalid infringement on Section 1141(a)); Frantz Mfg. Co.
v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (characterizing the stockholders’ power to amend
the bylaws “as an inherent feature of the corporate structure”); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra
note 9, § 1.11, 1-24. One specific example of a limit on the power to amend the bylaws is
Section 216 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which provides “[a] bylaw amendment
adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of
directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors.” Tit. 8, § 216.
Note that this is different from the validity of the bylaw provision itself.
65. See Frantz Mfg. Co., 501 A.2d at 407; Am. Int’l Rent A Car, Inc. v. Cross, No. 7583,
1984 WL 8204, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1984). This is, of course, subject to the rule articulated
in Schnell v. Christ-Craft Industries, Inc., that otherwise legal director action may be
invalidated if taken for an inequitable purpose. 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
66. See ERNEST L. FOLK, III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 109, 23-24 (1st
ed. 1972) (commenting that incorporators generally prefer to insert provisions in the bylaws
as opposed to the charter). The default voting standard for stockholder approval of a bylaw
amendment is a majority of the shares present and entitled to vote on the matter. See tit. 8,
§§ 109(a), 216(1). In contrast, the voting standard for stockholder approval of a charter
amendment is a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, and this does not take
into account any separate class or series votes that may also be triggered. See id. § 242(b)(2). 
67. See WELCH ET AL., supra note 43, § 102.9, 1-24 (“The invalidity of one provision in a
certificate of incorporation will not necessarily affect the validity of other provisions or matters
approved by stockholders in the same vote.” (emphasis added)).
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fee-shifting bylaws, arbitration provisions, and minimum threshold
requirements.68 Forum selection provisions in charters and bylaws
were the first of these procedural mechanisms to emerge, arising in
response to a dramatic increase in multiforum litigation.69 The
forum selection clause movement gained momentum following the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s endorsement of such a provision in a
footnote in In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders’ Litigation70 and peaked
after the court expressly upheld the facial validity of an exclusive
forum selection bylaw in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund
v. Chevron Corp.71 Today, forum selection provisions can be found
with increasing frequency in public corporations’ organizational
documents.72 Litigation fee-shifting bylaws followed closely behind
68. See Ann M. Lipton, Limiting Litigation Through Corporate Governance Documents,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 176, 177-81 (Sean
Griffith et al., eds., Edward Elgar Pub. 2018) (summarizing developments in the private
ordering of stockholder litigation); Winship, supra note 6, at 500-18 (documenting the
development of corporate contract procedure).
69. See Winship, supra note 6, at 501-03 (describing the development of forum selection
clauses including the rise in multiforum litigation); see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven M.
Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, at 2 (Feb. 2, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstract_id.=1998482 [https://perma.cc/3GCK-9HJ4] (documenting
the rise in merger and acquisition litigation and multiforum litigation). For discussion of
forum selection provisions, see generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The
Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political
Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013); Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-
Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012);
Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder
Litigation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21362), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w21362.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8CF-BD7X]; Jared I. Wilson, The Value of Venue in
Corporate Litigation: Evidence from Exclusive Forum Provisions (Oct. 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstrac_id.=2646312 [https://perma.cc/U4FB-
T63R].
70. 990 A.2d 940, 960 n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v.
Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing to the rise in public corporation
adoption of forum selection bylaws leading up to the case); Romano & Sanga, supra note 69
(documenting the proliferation of forum selection provisions). 
71. 73 A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing to the broad language of Section 109(b) and
holding that the exclusive forum selection bylaws were facially valid even though they were
unilaterally adopted by the board); see also ALLEN, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that following
Boilermakers (June 2013 through October 2013), at least 112 Delaware corporations adopted
or announced plans to adopt such bylaws). The court has since clarified that forum selection
bylaws are only valid and enforceable with respect to suits addressing the internal affairs of
the corporation and not external disputes. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-
JTL, slip op. at 2-5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
72. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Enforceability of Board-Adopted Forum Selection Bylaws;
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forum selection bylaws. Less than a year after Boilermakers, the
Delaware Supreme Court in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis
Bund upheld fee-shifting bylaws as “valid and enforceable under
Delaware law.”73 While the fee-shifting bylaw in ATP Tour occurred
in the nonstock corporate context, the implications for stock
corporations were clear.74 Several public corporations adopted such
provisions in its wake.75 Ultimately, the Delaware state legislature
amended the General Corporation Law to bar the use of fee-shifting
provisions as applied to intracorporate disputes involving stock
corporations, stunting private ordering of this type.76
Corporate Litigation, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/
1202672782148/Enforceability-ofBoardAdopted-Forum-Selection-Bylaws/?slreturn=2018112
114815 [https://perma.cc/4W2D-6AWD] (reporting on exclusive forum bylaws at over one
hundred public corporations); Romano & Sanga, supra note 69; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP,
EXCLUSIVE FORUM BYLAWS GAIN MOMENTUM 1 (2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/
Publications/SC_Publication_Exclusive_Forum_Bylaws_Gain_Momentum.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M3T2-B38L] (reporting on the adoption of more than two dozen forum selection bylaws at
large corporations in 2013 and 2014).
73. 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014). The case occurred in the context of a certified question
of law from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. Id.
74. The statutes cited and interpreted as supporting fee-shifting bylaws for nonstock
corporations apply in the same manner to stock corporations. See Stephen Bainbridge, The
Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Ordered Solution to the Shareholder
Litigation Epidemic, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.professorbain
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-case-for-allowing-fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-
privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat.html [https://perma.cc/533L-YKSS] (“It
is widely assumed that the legal basis for upholding such a bylaw in the context of a mem-
bership corporation will carry over to a stock corporation.”).
75. See Tom Hals, US Companies Adopt Bylaws That Could Quash Some Investor
Lawsuits, REUTERS (July 7, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-litigation-
companies/us-companies-adopt-bylaws-that-could-quash-some-investor-lawsuits-idUSL2
NOPE1YZ20140707 [https://perma.cc/2QGH-RG55] (reporting on the first Delaware corpo-
rations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws).
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f) (2018); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9,
§ 1.10, at 1-22 (describing ATP Tour and the adoption of Section 102(f)). The amendment also
eliminates the ability for stock corporations to include exclusive forum or mandatory
arbitration clauses that affect intracorporate disputes. Tit. 8, § 115. Thus, while mandatory
arbitration clauses had been predicted to be the next iteration of ex ante corporate contract
procedure, the statute effectively foreclosed that possibility. See Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws
Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 809 (2015)
(“[M]andatory arbitration bylaws are the latest attempts to address [the] problem [of too
many lawsuits].”); Paul Weitzel, The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders
to Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 65, 68 (2013).
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Corporate governance through private ordering has not been a
one-sided endeavor. Stockholders, led by activist hedge funds and
other large institutional holders, have proposed bylaw amendments
aimed at increasing stockholders’ role in corporate decision-making
and, relatedly, increasing management accountability. Two
prominent efforts have been majority voting bylaws and proxy
access bylaws.77 In 2005, stockholders put forth proposals to amend
corporate bylaws to shift to electing directors under a majority
voting standard as opposed to a plurality voting standard.78 The
majority voting movement has had widespread success, with some
form of majority voting in place at over 90 percent of S&P 500
companies in 2014.79 A more recent initiative was amending the
bylaws to provide stockholders with access to the corporation’s proxy
statement for purposes of nominating director candidates.80 Despite
a failed federal regulatory attempt to mandate proxy access for
director nominations,81 the private ordering of proxy access in
corporations’ bylaws by stockholders has been successful.82 In 2009,
the Delaware legislature amended the DGCL to allow a corporation
to provide for both proxy access and reimbursement of proxy
77. Other governance reform efforts by stockholders have also included poison pill
redemption bylaws; increased board independence; increased ability for stockholders to call
a special meeting; director qualifications and incentives; separation of the chairman of the
board and CEO positions; changes to executive compensation; and repealing classified boards.
See Fisch, supra note 2, at 1644-52 (describing stockholder efforts at corporate governance
reform). See generally Smith et al., supra note 2 (describing stockholder private ordering
efforts).
78. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 1649-50; see also David C. McBride & Rolin P. Bissell,
Delaware’s Flexible Approach to Majority Voting for Directors, 10 WALL ST. LAW., June 2006,
at 1.
79. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2016). In comparison, in 2005 only nine of S&P 100 companies had
majority voting in place. Id.
80. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 1648.
81. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating federal
proxy access rule, Rule 14a-11).
82. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 1649; Nick Grabar & Leah LaPorte Malone, Getting Ready
for Proxy Access, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2015/10/
getting-ready-for-proxy-access/ [https://perma.cc/D37Z-T8K2] (stating that “[p]roxy access
bylaws are proliferating”); Boardroom Accountability Project, N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, http://
comptroller.nyc.gov/boardroom-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/Q5G7-MK2K]; see also Geis,
supra note 5, at 614-17; Skeel, supra note 40, at 5-8 (summarizing the history of proxy access
bylaws); Smith et al., supra note 2, at 161-63.
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solicitation expenses in its bylaws.83 These amendments specifically
enable proxy access through private ordering in a corporation’s or-
ganizational documents.84 Indeed, the Court of Chancery stated in
explaining the statutory amendments that they “make plain that
which had always been understood by most Delaware corporate
lawyers, which is that the stockholders of Delaware corporations
have the authority to adopt potent bylaws shaping a more competi-
tive election process.”85
* * * 
In sum, public corporations are increasingly becoming “laborato-
ries of corporate governance,”86 from experimenting with different
private ordering approaches to calibrating governance through ex
ante contracting in the entity’s organizational documents.87 This
phenomenon raises two important questions for corporate law going
forward: (1) What is the proper framework for delineating enforce-
able provisions?88 and (2) If enforceable, what is the proper frame-
work for interpreting these provisions? It is the latter question that
is the focus of the remaining sections.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL “CONTRACTS”
The combination of a corporation’s certificate of incorporation,
bylaws, and applicable state statutes has been described by the
Delaware courts as a “flexible contract” (1) between the State and
the corporation, (2) between the corporation and its stockholders,
83. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112-13 (2009). These amendments overruled the Del-
aware Supreme Court’s earlier decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (invalidating a stockholder proposed proxy access bylaw).
84. See tit. 8, §§ 112-13.
85. Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 356 n.244 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d,
15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (mem.).
86. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 181.
87. There are some scholars who would assert that current law does not yet allow for
optimal private ordering in the public corporation context and advocate for statutory reform
to allow for even more corporate governance contracting. See id.
88. For a discussion of this question see generally, for example, Geis, supra note 5, and
Winship, supra note 6.
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and (3) among the stockholders of the corporation.89 This view is a
reflection of the contractarian theory of the firm—the legal fiction
that describes the corporation as a nexus of contracting relation-
ships—which also has been cited as providing the normative basis
for the private ordering of corporate governance in organizational
documents.90 Relying on the contract metaphor, the Delaware
courts91 have repeatedly held that when interpreting an entity’s
organizational documents, “general rules of contract interpretation
apply to [their] terms.”92 In Delaware, those general rules include
giving terms their plain meaning by applying the “four corners” rule
to determine if extrinsic evidence should be considered in interpret-
ing ambiguous words or phrases and applying the principle of contra
proferentem.93
This Part begins by providing the background for the contract
metaphor that has served as the basis for importing contract
principles to resolve questions of interpretation. While metaphors
can be a useful tool in explaining unfamiliar or new concepts and
89. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939, 952, 957
(Del. Ch. 2013); see also Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del.
2010). For a discussion of whether LLC operating agreements are common law contracts, see
Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Ties that Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding
Commitments, 68 SMU L. REV. 811, 820, 828 (2015).
90. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976); see also Jill
E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
373, 378-79 (2018).
91. Section 111 of the DGCL provides the Court of Chancery with “[j]urisdiction to
interpret, apply, enforce or determine the validity of corporate instruments and provisions,”
which specifically includes charters and bylaws, among other documents. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 111 (2018); cf. id. tit. 6, § 17-111 (2018) (giving the Delaware Chancery Court juris-
diction over the interpretation of partnership agreements).
92. Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Del. 1990); see Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188.
“Indeed, the certificate of incorporation, if it needs to be interpreted, is construed as a
contract.” BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.3, 1-5 n.17 (citing Berlin v. Emerald
Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 488 (Del. 1988); Ellingwood v. Wolf ’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743
(Del. 1944)); see also Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del.
1990).
93. See Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Hayes, 106 A.3d 1029, 1033 (Del. 2013) (“[T]he terms
of a charter provision ... are given their plain meaning.”); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Del.
Racing Ass’n, 840 A.2d 624, 630 (Del. 2003) (“[C]ontra proferentem [is the well-established]
principle of construction, which [asserts] that ambiguities in a contract should be construed
against the drafter.”); Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 824 (Del. 1992) (“When
construing a contract, and unless a contrary intent appears, we will give words their ordinary
meaning.”).
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making sense of less settled areas of the law, there is a danger that,
over time, legal metaphors can evolve into propositional state-
ments.94 Recent decisions legitimizing the private ordering of liti-
gation procedures contain strong language embracing the contract
metaphor that appears to cross that line.95 The second half of this
Part addresses why it is a normative misstep to transform organiza-
tional documents into contracts for interpretation analyses.
A. The Contract Metaphor
The rhetoric of contract law is a well-established part of corporate
jurisprudence. For almost two centuries, the contract metaphor has
been used in theorizing the corporation and developing the prin-
ciples that govern the role, enforcement, and interpretation of a
corporation’s organizational documents.96 In 1819, the United States
Supreme Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward held
that a corporate charter was “a contract made on a valuable
consideration,” and a “contract for the security and disposition of
property.”97 Twenty years later, the Delaware Court of Chancery
similarly declared that the “charter is the contract between the
company and the State.”98 While these early cases centered on the
corporation’s relationship with the State, subsequent descriptions
of a corporation’s organizational documents included stockholders
in the contractual relationship.99 In Delaware, the following
94. See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 803 (2002) (“Metaphor theorists warn against mistaking meta-
phors for ‘propositional statements.’”). 
95. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del.
Ch. 2013); see also Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010).
96. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
97. 17 U.S. 4 (Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819). In Dartmouth College, the Court was faced with
the “political question of the degree of freedom that private corporations should have from
legislative control.” See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES
AND MATERIAL ON CORPORATIONS 22 (8th ed. 2013). Specifically, the Court had to address
whether a corporate charter was a contract in light of the constitutional limitation on a state’s
ability to impair the obligations of a contract. Id. at 21. While Dartmouth College involved the
charter of a college, it was understood to extend well beyond that limited context to
corporations more generally. See id. at 22.
98. State v. Wilmington Bridge Co., 2 Del. Ch. 58, 60 (1838).
99. See Morris v. Am. Pub. Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 700 (Del. Ch. 1923) (finding that the
corporate charter served as a contract between (1) the state and the corporation, (2) the
corporation and its stockholders, and (3) “the stockholders inter sese”). 
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language from Lawson v. Household Financial Corp. is frequently
cited in applying the contract metaphor:
Ever since the decision in the Dartmouth College Case ..., it has
been generally recognized in this country that the charter of a
corporation is a contract both between the corporation and the
state and the corporation and its stockholders. It is not neces-
sary to cite authorities to support this proposition.100
The loosening of corporate statutes and creation of the enabling
corporate law statutory regime illustrates the influence of the con-
tract metaphor on the evolution of corporate law.101 During the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the special chart-
ering system, which previously provided for strict regulation of
corporations, gave way to incorporation statutes.102 Over time, these
statutes evolved into the enabling statutory regime governing corpo-
rations today.103 Modern corporation statutes recognize freedom of
contracting in the creation of enforcement of organizational docu-
ments.104 Indeed, “[c]ontractual freedom is ... the overriding con-
cept.”105 As explained by two renowned corporate jurists: 
100. 152 A. 723, 727 (Del. Ch. 1930).
101. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 33-34 (2d ed. 2002)
(describing the evolution of corporate law and stating that “today all states have broadly
permissive enabling corporation statutes with very little evidence in any state statute of
regulatory or paternalistic provisions”).
102. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 132-35 (1970); Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of
Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers Have Little to Fear and What Might Be
Done About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 998-1006 (2008). See generally Allen et al., supra note 51,
at 861 (describing the evolution of corporation law).
103. HURST, supra note 102, at 70-71; Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical
Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 501 (2002); Taylor,
supra note 102, at 998-1000.
104. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core, the Delaware
General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which leave latitude for substantial private
ordering[s].”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1257, 1260 (2001) (describing the DGCL as creating “a wide realm for private ordering”).
Arguably, corporate statutes do this implicitly, while unincorporated entity statutes do so
explicitly. See Cox, supra note 4, at 281-83 (“For example, the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act provides: ‘It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.’ General corporate statutes, even in Delaware, lack any parallel to this provi-
sion.” (footnotes omitted)).
105. WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
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The Delaware General Corporation Law ..., which has emerged
as the market leader, is “broadly enabling” and designed to
facilitate individual tailoring rather than “one-size-fits-all”
solutions.... [T]he DGCL and its counterparts predominantly
offer default rules that can be altered through private ordering
via the corporation’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws.106
This emphasis on private ordering reinforces and perpetuates the
idea that the charter and bylaws are “contracts” that allow for
parties to customize their provisions.107
But it is the law-and-economics movement that has been credit-
ed with firmly cementing the contract metaphor in how the corpora-
tion is conceptualized today. As large public corporations came to
dominate the United States, economists developed the “nexus-of-
contracts” model to distinguish and justify the “firm” as a means of
production.108 Legal scholars imported the nexus-of-contracts theory
to explain the corporate form and soon the “contractual theory of the
firm ... dominate[d] the thinking of most economists and economi-
cally oriented corporate law scholars.”109 Under this theory of the
firm, the relationship between directors, officers, and stockholders
can be characterized as contractual in nature with the charter and
bylaws serving as a primary source of this contractual arrange-
ment.110
ORGANIZATION 93 (3d ed. 2009).
106. Strine & Laster, supra note 47, at 14; see also COX & HAZEN, supra note 101, at 57
(“Under the corporation acts of most states, wide latitude is given to the organizers to include
in the articles certain optional provisions and to make certain special variations on the or-
dinary rules prescribed by statute.”); Strine et al., supra note 46, at 56-57.
107. Strine et al., supra note 46, at 56-57.
108. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, 386-405 (1937); Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 90, at 311.
109. Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1989). See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12, 163 (1991); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
50, at 1430-33; see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415-17 (1989) (describing the work of early
scholars behind the nexus-of-contracts metaphor). 
110. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 101, at 59 (“The essence of the contract is the corpo-
ration’s articles of incorporation and the laws of the state of incorporation. The relationships
and their corresponding duties and rights that flow through these documents underscore the
view, discussed earlier, that the corporation is a ‘nexus of contracts.’”). State corporate law
also serves as an important source of the corporate “contract.” See Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 50, at 1417.
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Today, conceptualizing the corporation and its organizational
documents as contracts is well entrenched.111 The contractarian
influence in shaping corporate law theory and doctrine can be easily
seen.112 American corporate law statutes rebuffed a mandatory
approach, instead developing as a “specialized contract law” that
allows for the private ordering of the vast majority of corporate
characteristics.113 And in Delaware, the courts have embraced and
endorsed the contract metaphor, holding that contract law presides
over issues involving both the enforcement and interpretation of the
charter and bylaws.114
B. A Unique “Contractual” Institution
In deciding recent disputes over the validity of ex ante corporate
governance provisions, the language used by the Delaware courts
appears to take the contract metaphor one step further, equating
charters and bylaws with contracts. For example, in Boilermakers,
then-Chancellor Strine wrote, “In an unbroken line of decisions
dating back several generations, our Supreme Court has made clear
that the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a
111. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 22 (2008) (“It has long been recognized ... that the corporation ... should be viewed
as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or set of implicit and explicit contracts.”); William W. Bratton, Jr., The
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1471-72 (1989) (describing the history of the nexus-of-contracts model’s rise to prominence);
Joo, supra note 94, at 780 (describing the nexus-of-contract theory as “near-orthodoxy in
academic corporations law”). 
112. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-called
nexus of contracts theory.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to
Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989)
(“Critics and advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has in
the last decade swept the legal theory of the corporation.”); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean
Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 (1993) (“[T]he nexus-of-contracts view
of the modern corporation and the principal-agent explanation of some important aspects of
the firm ... have had profound implications for some of the most important issues of
corporation law.”).
113. See Strine et al., supra note 46, at 56-57 (“American corporate law statutes essentially
operate as a specialized contract law governing the relations of the fiduciaries who manage
a corporation and the corporation’s stockholders.”); see also Fisch, supra note 90, at 378-80.
114. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010);
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”115 In the opinion,
Chancellor Strine rejected a holding by the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, stating that the decision
“rest[ed] on a failure to appreciate the contractual framework
established by the DGCL for Delaware corporations and their
stockholders.”116 The Delaware Supreme Court espoused similar
sentiments in ATP Tour, stating that:
Because corporate bylaws are “contracts among a corporation’s
shareholders,” a fee-shifting provision ... would fall within the
contractual exception to the American Rule [which permits the
parties to alter by contract the ordinary rule that each party
pays its own attorney’s fees]. Therefore, a fee-shifting bylaw
would not be prohibited under Delaware common law.117
Critics of these decisions assert that they evidence a transforma-
tion from treating organizational documents like contracts to al-
lowing organizational documents to become contracts themselves.118
Because of the breakdown in traditional notions of contract for-
mation, primarily mutual assent, when considering organizational
documents, critics contend that casting the charter and bylaws as
contracts for determining enforceability is normatively problem-
atic.119 Notably, legal scholarship to date has not specifically taken
115. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955; see id. at 939 (“[T]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation
constitute part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders
formed within the statutory framework of the DGCL. This contract is, by design, flexible and
subject to change in the manner that the DGCL spells out.”).
116. Id. at 956 (discussing Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
117. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014).
118. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 274; Geis, supra note 5, at 611-12.
119. See Cox, supra note 4, at 259 (asserting that a shareholder’s relationship with the
corporation is not contractual in nature); DeMott, supra note 5, at 287-88 (critiquing the
concept of consent underlying enforcement of forum selection bylaws unilaterally adopted by
the board); Geis, supra note 5, at 630; see also Fisch, supra note 90, at 382-83 (objecting to the
contract metaphor in adjudicating ex ante corporate contracting based on the unequal powers
of boards and stockholders); Larry A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW.
161, 166 (2014) (examining corporate consent in the context of fee-shifting bylaws); Lipton,
supra note 62, at 603-16 (discussing the many aspects of the corporate form and its
participants that make it unlike a contractual relationship). For scholarship supporting
corporate contracting, see Smith et al., supra note 2, at 127 (proposing “empower[ing]
shareholders in public corporations by facilitating their ability to contract” using bylaws);
Winship, supra note 6, at 486 (supporting the private ordering of litigation procedure within
a proposed framework).
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issue with contract law presiding over the principles of interpre-
tation applied to organizational documents.120 For example, Profes-
sor George Geis, who questions the application of contract law in
resolving ex ante disputes, writes that “the tools of contract inter-
pretation seem to work quite well for resolving uncertain meaning
in corporate instruments.”121 Contract interpretation principles do
not, however, apply neatly to charters and bylaws. Some of the same
objections levied against describing charters and bylaws as con-
tracts for purposes of enforceability also make application of
contract interpretation principles problematic. In particular, the
concept of mutual assent, which is consistently cited as lacking in
bylaw and charter formation, underlies several interpretation
principles (for example, the parol evidence rule).122
Further, the purpose underlying contract interpretation prin-
ciples—to serve as tools to assist the courts in ascertaining the
parties’ intentions at the time the contract was entered into—is an
ill fit when considering corporate organizational documents.123 This
is because the framework and assumptions surrounding contract
formation and those surrounding charter and bylaw formation are
dissimilar in important respects. First, stockholders lack the same
ability to bargain for their own interests as is assumed to exist
under contract principles; as a result, stockholders can be more
accurately described as “wards,” rather than as contracting count-
erparties, in the corporate structure.124 Second, the legal framework
for contract interpretation envisions a system where parties pri-
vately create and structure the terms governing their relationship;
in contrast, the legal framework for the corporation takes into
account public, state law duties.125 Instead of seeking to ascertain
120. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
121. Geis, supra note 5, at 637; cf. Cox, supra note 4, at 272-74 (taking issue with the
application of contract law for determining substantive rights but not for interpreting
organizational documents). Professor Geis does acknowledge that applying contract inter-
pretation principles to organizational documents will not work perfectly. Geis, supra note 5,
at 637 n.164 (noting that different jurisdictions apply different interpretation principles and
that the contextualist approach may be more difficult to implement). 
122. See Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 498-99, 505 (2004).
123. See Lipton, supra note 68, at 612-13.
124. Id. at 605-11.
125. See id. at 612 (“In the corporate context, however, courts do not evaluate whether
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the specific parties’ intentions at the time of contract formation,
courts in the corporate context must evaluate and construe the
terms of the charter and bylaws in accordance with the state-
imposed terms at the time of the dispute.126
Decisions preceding Boilermakers and ATP Tour that employ less
forceful contractarian language are also cause for concern. These
cases cite heavily to the contract metaphor in deciding questions of
interpretation.127 While useful, metaphors are of limited normative
value.128 In order to work, a metaphor requires a simplifying of the
concepts being compared.129 As explained by Professor Thomas Joo:
Mapping can be done only between abstractions, not between
messy realities. Because analogy and metaphor use abstracted
portraits to stand in for more complex real phenomena, they
always make use of a kind of metonymy. For both the source and
the target, the name of a thing or concept is used to refer to
something less than the whole and that essentialized part is
taken to stand for the whole.130
managers behaved in accordance with shareholders’ intentions, but rather whether they
behaved in accordance with state-imposed duties of conduct.”); see also Sciabacucchi v.
Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018) (“The certificate of
incorporation differs from an ordinary contract, in which private parties execute a private
agreement in their personal capacities to allocate their rights and obligations. When accepted
by the Delaware Secretary of State, the filing of a certificate of incorporation effectuates the
sovereign act of creating a ‘body corporate’—a legally separate entity. The State of Delaware
is an ever-present party to the resulting corporate contract, and the terms of the corporate
contract incorporate the provisions of the DGCL.”).
126. See Lipton, supra note 68, at 613 (“Michael Klausner and Henry Hansmann argue
that incorporators and shareholders thus voluntarily opt into a system whereby the state—
rather than themselves—will construct the terms of the corporate contract on an ongoing
basis because (given the indefinite life of the corporate entity) the law can respond more
completely and rapidly to changes necessitated by business exigencies than can the corporate-
governance documents.” (citing Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1, 2, 9 (2006))); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Gov-
ernance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (2013)).
127. See, e.g., Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Hayes, 106 A.3d 1029, 1033 (Del. 2013) (“[T]he
terms of a charter provision, like any other contract, are given their plain meaning.” (emphasis
added)); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.3, 1-5 n.17 (“Indeed, the certificate of in-
corporation, if it needs to be interpreted, is construed as a contract.” (citing Berlin v. Emerald
Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 488 (Del. 1988); Ellingwood v. Wolf ’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743
(Del. 1944)).
128. See Joo, supra note 94, at 784, 799.
129. See id. at 799.
130. Id. at 799; see also Cox, supra note 4, at 260 (cautioning that the contractarian
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Thus, using the metaphor to apply contract doctrine to questions of
charter and bylaw interpretation can lead courts to skip over the
“messy realit[y]” (in other words, nuances) of organizational doc-
uments in favor of the ease of decision-making.131 
A corporation’s organizational documents are differently situated
than most commercial contracts in important respects. Characteris-
tics such as the ability of parties to unilaterally amend certain
provisions (and relatedly the concept of consent); the intended
longevity of the documents; the number of “parties” to an organiza-
tional document (especially in the public corporation context); and
the process of creating, drafting, and negotiating the terms of these
documents are among those characteristics that distinguish
organizational documents from traditional contracts.132 As one
corporate treatise correctly explains:
The articles of incorporation are not merely a private contract
between the incorporators or organizers as to their own individ-
ual enterprise. They are much more, viz., the constitution of a
continuing statutory business association that consists of a
shifting group of associates who are expected to invest their
money in the enterprise or take by transfer the places of those
who have invested. Future shareholders have no voice in draft-
ing the articles of incorporation that limit and define their
rights. Most investors become stockholders without reading the
language “is impactful because it is more than just a metaphor; it has substantive bite”). 
131. See Joo, supra note 94, at 799, 805 (“Thus, the model lulls us into thinking we can
avoid the hard questions of how the law reaches its value judgments.”). The legitimacy of the
contract metaphor in and of itself has also been questioned. See id. at 789 (“Contractarianism
is a highly figurative metaphor. Corporation as contract is not based on a set of clear struc-
tural correspondences between corporations and contracts. Although the metaphor lacks
analogical structure, it derives power from multiple, ‘cross-weaving’ layers of associated
concepts that simultaneously make descriptive and normative arguments about ‘corporations,’
as well as about ‘contracts.’ The lack of structure should make us question the reliability of
the metaphor as a heuristic.”); id. (pointing out the difference between the legal and economic
definition of “contract” and that “the metaphor plays fast and loose with the legal concept of
‘contract’”); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1274-76 (1999) (arguing against the application of a contractual approach to the duty
of loyalty); Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 784 (2006) (“The contractarian theory has turned out to be based
largely on an entirely plausible, but in fact imaginary, world of contracting.”).
132. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 101, at 143-44; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1618, 1659 (1989); Geis, supra note 5, at 630-32; Joo, supra note 94, at 794.
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articles of incorporation to ascertain provisions that may deprive
shareholders of their customary rights and protections.133
Given the corporate context in which they are created and operate,
organizational documents are their own unique contract-like in-
stitution. The metaphor of the charter and bylaws as contracts
evokes a notion of formation and function that is different than
reality in public corporations.134
Contract interpretation principles also need to be adjusted to take
into account the state statutory and fiduciary duty backdrop against
which organizational documents exist.135As Professor James Cox
succinctly points out, “Contracts and corporate law are not mirror
images.”136 Corporate law’s enshrinement of fiduciary principles and
its system of checks-and-balances on corporate power create
expectations in parties and implicate policy considerations that are
fundamentally distinct from those in contract law.137 As a result,
courts should not simply interpret and enforce the “contract” as
written. Interpretation analysis of the charter and bylaws should
instead take into account the parties’ intent and social welfare
considerations as opposed to only the “hypothetical bargain” and
“arms-length negotiation” constructs from contract law.138
133. COX & HAZEN, supra note 101, at 57; see also Joo, supra note 94, at 792-93 (asserting
that while bargaining over corporate governance terms in the charter and bylaws may take
place in “small corporations, nothing of the sort happens in a large publicly traded
corporation”).
134. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 101, at 57.
135. See Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 488 (Del. 1989) (“Nevertheless, the
contract rights of the stockholders of the corporation are also subject to the provisions of the
Delaware General Corporation Law.”).
136. Cox, supra note 4, at 268-69.
137. See id. (citing the imposition of fiduciary duties as a “fundamental distinction between
judging the parties’ behavior through the contract lens versus the corporate law lens”). Judge
Cardozo’s famous opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon is often quoted to highlight the distinction
in judging the conduct of contracting parties as compared to fiduciaries: “A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y.
1928).
138. See Joo, supra note 94, at 798-99, 820 (“[A] court interpreting the corporate ‘contract’
does not ask what the parties would have consented to; it tells them what they should have
consented to.”); see also Coffee, supra note 132, at 1622 (“[C]ourts will not seek simply to
enforce the contract as written, but will to some uncertain extent serve as an arbiter to de-
termine how the powers granted to management by the corporate charter may be exercised
under unforeseen circumstances.”).
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There is evidence that the Delaware courts are, from time to time,
already making this adjustment—declining to strictly import and
apply contract law principles when interpreting organizational
documents. Noting that corporate organizational documents are
generally not the product of a bilateral negotiation, the courts have
not applied and considered parol evidence with the same force as in
the case of a commercial contract.139 Where corporate organizational
provisions were ambiguous, they were construed in favor of the
stockholder franchise.140 Relatedly, a charter provision has been
interpreted in a manner that vests decision-making power in the
traditional majority vote as opposed to vesting special rights in
certain directors or stockholders.141 Courts are not, however, con-
sistent in reconciling contract and corporate principles in interpret-
ing charter and bylaw provisions.142 For every example of the court
diverging from traditional contract principles to account for
corporate doctrine and policy, there are many examples of strict
importation and application of contract law without consideration
or deference to the corporate context in which such provisions
exist.143 Moreover, even in the cases where the court departs from
contract principles, the court cites the familiar contract metaphor.144
The reference to the contract metaphor in and of itself can be
damaging in that it masks the fact that the court’s analysis involves
fiduciary considerations and value judgments attendant to the
separation of powers in a corporation.145
139. See WELCH ET AL., supra note 43, § 102.16 (citing KFC Nat’l Council & Advert. Coop.,
Inc. v. KFC Corp., No. 5191-VCS, slip op. at 28-33 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2011)).
140. Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599, at *4-5 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 8, 2010); see Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch.
2002).
141. See KFC, slip op. at 28-33.
142. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 765 F.3d 350, 370-73 (3d Cir. 2014) (Fuentes,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as misapplying Delaware’s contractual juris-
prudence, as well as disregarding Delaware’s corporate public policy surrounding advance-
ment that would have favored application of contra proferentem to the bylaws).
143. See, e.g., ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014);
Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Hayes, 106 A.3d 1029, 1033 (Del. 2013); Boilermakers Local 154
Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939, 956-57 (Del. Ch. 2013).
144. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188 (reiterating that “bylaws are contracts among a
corporation’s shareholders”); KFC, slip op. at 22, 29-30, 33; Harrah’s Entm’t, 802 A.2d at 309,
311-12.
145. See Joo, supra note 94, at 805 (“[The contract metaphor] misleadingly suggests that
the law imposes no value judgments but merely rubber stamps freely made individual
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The distinctions discussed herein between organizational doc-
uments and traditional commercial contracts have important
implications for interpretation principles. The dominance of the
contractarian view of the corporation has, however, overshadowed
this area of the law. Corporate scholarship and jurisprudence to
date has failed to examine explicitly the unique stature of the
charter and bylaws as compared to traditional contracts and then
link that analysis to the proper interpretation framework to be
applied. The next section attempts to do just that.
III. INTERPRETING ORGANIZATIONAL “CONTRACTS”
“Under the modern American law of contracts, almost all appli-
cations of legal doctrine turn on questions of interpretation.”146
If there was ever an appropriate time to address the issue of
charter and bylaw interpretation, it is now. Corporate governance
initiatives involving amending the charter and bylaws are on the
rise and have shown no signs of slowing down.147 In considering
recent efforts, the Delaware courts have shown a willingness to up-
hold ex ante governance provisions in organizational documents.148
Accordingly, charter and bylaw interpretation will quickly take on
an influential role in shaping corporate law and norms that it
arguably has not historically had. As ex ante corporate governance
provisions, such as forum selection bylaws, survive enforceability
challenges, disputes surrounding their interpretation and applica-
tion will naturally follow. Indeed, interpretation will become more
and more important as the courts are asked to “draw fine-grained
distinctions between bylaw variants” that result from creative
lawyering.149 Interpretation will also play a central role in the
adjudication of new innovations in ex ante governance provisions.150 
decisions.”).
146. Katz, supra note 122, at 496.
147. See supra Part I.
148. See Winship, supra note 6, at 502-03, 507, 510.
149. See Geis, supra note 5, at 640.
150. See id. at 639 (“If corporate governance initiatives are indeed emphasizing ex-ante
tactics, we should expect to see a wide range of innovative bylaws in the coming years.”);
Ridgley, supra note 1, at 325, 330 (assessing the rise in bylaw governance provisions);
Winship, supra note 6, at 487 (describing an increase in corporate procedure provisions); cf.
Katz, supra note 122, at 496.
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Interpretation disputes in this area of corporate law are inevita-
ble. The charter and bylaws (and any amendments thereto) are the
product of human effort and, as such, are subject to error and
ambiguity.151 Bounded rationality,152 framing and endowment
effects,153 self-interestedness,154 status quo bias,155 and other be-
havioral biases and limitations can all impact the drafting of a
provision.156 Indeed, research has observed patterns in charters
suggesting the influence of these types of behavioral phenomena on
their drafting.157 Moreover, scholars across all disciplines agree that
structuring a relationship and accurately reducing parties’ expec-
tations to words is a difficult, if not impossible, task.158 And the
151. In this sense, organizational documents and contracts are identical. Cf. Katz, supra
note 122, at 502.
152. Bounded rationality has been described as the “fact that people have a limited
capacity to absorb and process information; consequently, real people will often rely on ‘rules
of thumb’ or heuristics to assist in their decision-making processes.” Brian JM Quinn,
Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 174-75 (2011); see Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality, in UTILITY
AND PROBABILITY 15, 15 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990); see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449
(2003).
153. See Quinn, supra note 152, at 174-77 (describing how the way decisions are framed
can affect the outcome of a decision, including whether a contractual provision is endowed (in
other words, a default term)).
154. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 14-16 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
155. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).
156. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1271 (2003); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1998);
Korobkin, supra note 155, at 656; Quinn, supra note 152, at 142 (“Behavioral economics
suggests the framing of decisions, including the selection of contract defaults, is important in
determining outcome of such decisions.”).
157. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,
361 (1996); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 822 (1995). See generally Quinn, supra note 152 (summarizing research on
behavioral economics).
158. See Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation
and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 576 (2006) (“[C]ourts,
whether implicitly or explicitly, and regardless of their jurisprudential philosophy ...
acknowledge the impracticality (due to transaction costs) and the impossibility (due to the
limits of human imagination ...) of producing an all-encompassing, express agreement.”);
Grundfest, supra note 69, at 382-83 (“To be sure, every contract is incomplete, and this forum
selection language can generate disputes over its application in specific instances.”); Claire
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probability for error is even higher when, as is the case with
organizational documents, language is intended to project into the
future and govern a long-term relationship.159 Thus, organizational
documents will always be flawed, necessitating judicial involve-
ment.160
A. An Interpretation Framework
Organizational documents are their own unique contractual in-
stitution and therefore demand their own interpretation framework.
In order to structure a framework, the first step is to recognize the
different types of provisions in the charter and bylaws. They can be
categorized as follows: (1) technical, statutorily mandated language,
(2) fundamental corporate rights, (3) organizational “boilerplate,”
(4) novel provisions, and (5) individually negotiated provisions. Each
category elicits different policy concerns relevant to interpretation.
Deciding which interpretation theory is best suited for a particular
category requires consideration of the following questions: “First,
what goals should the state’s interpretive rules attempt to imple-
ment? Second, what rules best implement these goals?”161 The
A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete
Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 193-94, 198 (2009); Ralph James Mooney, The New
Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1147 (1995) (“The assumption that most
parties in fact reduce their entire agreement to a single, perfectly accurate writing [is]
unrealistic.”); Veasey & Simon, supra note 12, at 895 (“It is a rare contract that needs
absolutely no interpretation.”); Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias, Moral Hazard,
and Situational Pressure, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 379, 380 (2015) (“Drafting
and reviewing a written contract is already understood to be a complicated and complex
process.”).
As Chief Justice Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster have observed in their experience
adjudicating business disputes:
[C]ontractual drafting is a difficult task.... Different language sets up the
possibility of a different result, creating opportunities for litigation that
otherwise might not exist. Greater complexity also increases the possibility for
human error, conflicting contractual provisions, and ambiguity, all of which can
leave [parties] potentially exposed.
Strine & Laster, supra note 47, at 13.
159. See Coffee, supra note 132, at 1659.
160. See id. at 1620 (asserting that just like judicial involvement in long-term contracts,
“judicial involvement [in corporate governance] is not an aberration but an integral part of
such contracting”).
161. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 937. Schwartz and Scott also include a third
question: “Third, should the rules be mandatory or defaults?” Id.
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primary sources of contract law—the UCC, the Second Restatement
of Contracts, and state common law—reflect a goal of neutral
preference, (in other words, the court’s goal is to ascertain the
parties’ objective intentions).162 In contrast to traditional contracts,
public corporations’ organizational documents play a unique role in
providing for the individual governance of a corporation as well as
shaping the broader corporate community and markets.163 Taking
into account the public law aspects of these organizational docu-
ments, a strong argument can be made that the first order goal for
interpretation of certain provisions should be the parties’ intent in
light of social welfare considerations.164 Given their distinctive
status as creatures of both private contract law and public law,
different types of provisions in public corporations’ charters and
bylaws implicate different goals, and thus application of different
interpretive rules.165
Analyzing the relevant policy concerns and interpretive goals, this
framework links an appropriate interpretation theory and its
principles—textual, contextual, or statutory—to that category. A
summary of this analysis can be found in Table 1. A textualist or
formalist theory of interpretation advocates for a “narrow eviden-
tiary base” in making interpretation determinations, with the con-
tract itself being the most important component of any analysis.166
Textualist interpretive principles include using a hard parol ev-
idence rule, applying the plain meaning rule, giving effect to
162. See id. In the traditional commercial contract setting, however, a strong line of
scholarship advocates for maximizing contractual surplus as the first order goal. See, e.g., id.
at 928 (advocating for this goal in the merchant-to-merchant setting); Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544, 598-99, 612
(2003). In their work, Schwartz and Scott then point out that “an intelligent pursuit of this
goal satisfies such second order goals as predictability and stability.” Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 13, at 928 n.5.
163. For a discussion of the systemic implications and role of public corporations’ orga-
nizational documents, see Part III.A.3. 
164. Indeed, some scholars assert that this already takes place in the corporate inter-
pretation analyses. See Coffee, supra note 132, at 1622; Joo, supra note 94, at 798-99.
165. See Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 11, at 268 (stating that the charter and bylaws are
“hybrid legal structures that ... straddle the public-private divide”).
166. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 162, at 569. This is the traditional Willistonian ap-
proach. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631, at 948-49, 951-
52 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 1961); see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1146 (2006).
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integration/merger clauses, and permitting courts to resolve in-
terpretation disputes on summary judgment.167 New York and
Delaware, along with a majority of the states, adopt a textualist
approach to contract interpretation.168 In contrast, California, as
well as the Uniform Commercial Code and the Second Restatement
of Contracts, follow a contextual theory of contract interpretation.169
A contextual theory holds that the context in which a contract was
drafted is necessary for proper interpretation.170 A contextualist
court thus allows a broad evidentiary base in resolving an interpre-
tation dispute.171 To that end, contextual principles include using a
soft parol evidence rule, denying presumptive effect to integra-
tion/merger clauses, rejecting the four corners rule, and allowing
extrinsic evidence.172 Finally, a statutory theory of interpretation
focuses on determining the original intent of the drafters and the
historic context in which the drafting occurred.173 This theory looks
to legislative intent in adjudicating interpretation cases.174
1. Technical, Statutorily Mandated Language
The first category of provisions exists only in the charter. Under
section 102(a) of the DGCL, a charter must contain certain informa-
tion to be valid and effective: (1) the name of the corporation (which
must satisfy certain parameters); (2) the name and address of the
registered agent; (3) a statement of the corporation’s purpose; (4) the
number of authorized shares of each class of stock created, including
par value; (5) the name(s) and address(es) of the incorporator(s); and
(6) the name(s) and address(es) of the initial director(s), if the power
167. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 932.
168. See id. at 928 n.1 (reporting that a strong majority of states adopt a textualist
interpretative approach); Veasey & Simon, supra note 12, at 898-99. 
169. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 928.
170. This is Corbin’s advocated approach to interpretation. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 499-500 (1952); see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1132, 1151.
171. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 939.
172. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
643-45 (Cal. 1968) (explaining how an inclusive parol evidence rule limits interpretation
discrepancies); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 939.
173. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1160. Similar to contract interpretation,
statutory interpretation divides into different camps of straight textualism and historical
conceptualism. See id. at 1161 n.108.
174. See id. at 1131.
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of the incorporator(s) is to terminate before the first election of
directors.175 By statute, strict compliance with section 102(a) is
required for a valid corporate existence.176 
The provisions in a charter that are a product of section 102(a)’s
requirements can be characterized as technical in nature. Not only
are the presence of the provisions mandated by statute, but to a
large degree the actual content of each provision is also dictated by
statute.177 Moreover, the purpose of these provisions is to put the
public on notice of the limited liability nature of the enterprise and
to serve process on the entity.178 These provisions do not implicate
fundamental corporate rights in a way that others discussed below
do.179 In light of the structured nature of section 102(a)’s provisions,
applying a formalist or textualist theory of interpretation would
make sense. The DGCL’s “all or nothing” position for satisfying the
corporate formation requirements, combined with the detailed,
mandatory nature of the applicable statutory provisions, means only
a limited evidentiary base is needed in interpreting the language,
thus weighing in favor of a textualist theory of interpretation.180
There will likely be little to interpret with respect to section 102(a)’s
provisions,181 and it is highly unlikely that the broader evidentiary
base allowed under a contextualist theory would even exist to apply
to an interpretation analysis. For example, section 102(a)(1) con-
tains a specific list of words (for example, “corporation,” “incorpo-
175. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) (2015).
176. See id. (“The certificate of incorporation shall set forth:” (emphasis added)); id. § 106.
In contrast, limited partnerships and limited liability companies only require “substantial
compliance” with the statute for valid existence. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(b) (2017);
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201(d)(3), (e)(3) (2006); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 201(c)
(2001).
177. For example, section 102(a)(4) requires that the charter contain the following specific
information concerning the capitalization of the entity: the total number of authorized shares
of stock; if applicable, the total number of each class of stock created; and the exact par value
or no par value of each class of stock. Tit. 8, § 102(a)(4). Section 102(a)(2) and section 131
require that the address for the registered office must include the street address, city, state,
county, and zip code. Id. §§ 102(a)(2), 131(c); see also id. §§ 131-32 (requiring each corporation
incorporated in Delaware to continuously maintain a registered office and agent within the
state).
178. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.3, n.25.
179. But see infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text (explaining two exceptions to this
statement).
180. See generally tit. 8, §§ 101-15.
181. See id. § 102(a).
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rated,” “company”), and requires that the name of a corporation
contain at least one, or an abbreviation of one, of those words and
be distinguishable from other entities on the Secretary of State’s
records.182 Thus, almost universally, all public corporations’ charters
provide in article one the following language: “The name of the
corporation is [Name], [a section 102(a) statutorily required suf-
fix].”183 Similarly, all information required to satisfy the inclusion of
the address(es) of the registered agent(s), incorporator(s), and, if
applicable, initial board of directors, is explicitly provided for in the
statute.184 As a result, there is little room for tailoring or variation
that would trigger a need for interpretation. Rather, the most com-
mon inquiry would involve validity—whether the statute’s explicit
requirements were satisfied or not.
There are two section 102(a) provisions that, depending on the
specific charter being reviewed, may not always fit the above analy-
sis. Section 102(a)(3) requires that the charter contain a statement
of the “nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or pro-
moted” by the corporation.185 In satisfying this requirement, cor-
porations generally take one of two routes: (1) include a general
statement of purpose that tracks the language suggested in the
statute, in other words, “[T]he purpose of the corporation is to
engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware”; or
(2) insert a highly defined purpose clause into the charter.186 If a
corporation chose to do the former, then such provision would fall in
the technical, statutorily mandated category for interpretation. If a
corporation chose the latter, it could potentially fall under individ-
ually negotiated provisions or fundamental corporate rights, de-
pending on the exact language in the provision.187 Similarly, under
section 102(a)(4) the charter must contain certain information
182. See id. 8, § 102(a)(1); Trans-Americas Airlines, Inc. v. Kenton, 491 A.2d 1139, 1142
(Del. 1985) (“[T]he Secretary of State has only one statutory duty: to ensure, in the exercise
of his discretion, that a new corporate name can be distinguished on the records of the
Division of Corporations from those names previously registered.”).
183. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, at FORM 1.5.
184. See tit. 8, §§ 102(a)(2), (5)-(6), 131(c). 
185. Id. § 102(a)(3).
186. See id. Of note, a highly defined purpose clause in a public corporation’s charter would
be extremely rare.
187. See infra Parts III.A.2 and III.A.5.
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regarding the capitalization of the corporation.188 To the extent that
a corporation has a basic capitalization structure with only common
stock, the language would be the technical language triggering a
formalistic interpretation. If, on the other hand, a corporation had
a much more complex capitalization structure, the common stock
terms may fall into the technical category, while the language pro-
viding for the preferred stock’s rights, powers, and preferences
would fall under the individually negotiated category described
below.189 As these two examples illustrate, where a particular type
of provision is classified will depend on its specific language and
context, thereby requiring a case-by-case interpretation analysis
from the courts.
2. Fundamental Corporate Rights
In addition to the contract metaphor, the charter and bylaws of
a corporation have been described as the constitutional documents
of a corporation.190 Characterizing organizational documents as
constitution-like highlights that the charter and bylaws set forth
fundamental rights, responsibilities, and powers for the governing
of the corporation and its participants. In this regard, many
provisions are relational provisions regulating the intracorporate
dealings among the directors, officers, and stockholders.191 Where
the charter and bylaws implicate fundamental corporate rights,
corporate law concerns should override strict application of contract
interpretation principles.192 A contextual approach allowing for a
broad base of evidence to be considered, including corporate law
policy and principles, would be appropriate in an interpretation
analysis of these types of provisions.
188. See tit. 8, § 102(a)(4).
189. See infra Part III.A.5. 
190. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1155 (Del. Ch. 1994) (de-
scribing the organizational documents as “the constitutional documents of a corporation”);
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 105, at 92-94; Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect
Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509, 564, 574 (2011).
191. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 105, at 94.
192. See Cox, supra note 4, at 271-72 (“Principles and perspectives in the rugged contract
setting simply do not survive in the relational setting of corporate law.”).
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How does one determine which provisions implicate fundamental
corporate rights? One category would be provisions touching on fun-
damental stockholder rights, which have traditionally been de-
scribed as the rights to “vote, sell, [and] sue.”193 The right to vote, for
example, has been an influential factor in prior Delaware decisions
where the court adjusted the traditional contract interpretation
analysis to take into account broader corporate law policies.194 For
instance, where corporate organizational provisions were ambigu-
ous, the Delaware courts construed such ambiguity in favor of the
stockholder franchise.195 Relatedly, the courts have interpreted a
charter provision in a manner that vests decision-making power in
the traditional majority vote as opposed to vesting special rights in
certain directors or stockholders.196 And in interpreting ambiguous
language in advance notice bylaw provisions, the courts have re-
solved doubts in favor of the stockholders’ electoral rights.197
Stated differently, a provision falling in the fundamental rights
category could be described as one that implicates the “rights and
expectations established under existing corporate law.”198 Propo-
nents of ex ante contracting recognize that there must be a limit to
permissible provisions, and that line is drawn when private or-
dering begins to impinge on the strong and reasonable expectations
193. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216 (1999)
(discussing the fundamental rights of stockholders); see Megan W. Shaner, Introduction,
Confronting New Market Realities: Implications for Stockholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue,
70 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2017).
194. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
195. See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010); Harrah’s
Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also Blasius Indus.,
Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (referencing the “central importance of
the [stockholder] franchise to the scheme of corporate governance” and applying heightened
scrutiny to the directors’ actions).
196. See KFC Nat’l Council & Advert. Coop., Inc. v. KFC Corp., No. 5191-VCS, slip op. at
27-33 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2011).
197. See Edward P. Welch & Jenness E. Parker, Delaware Court of Chancery Advises
Careful Drafting of Advance Notice Laws, 12 M & A LAW. 1, 1-3 (2008) (summarizing advance
notice bylaw cases and concluding that “[t]he overall focus seems to be on fairness to stock-
holders, given the importance of stockholders’ rights to nominate and elect directors”).
198. Hamermesh, supra note 119, at 172 (asserting that for consent considerations it is
important to ask whether the provision “place[s] too great a strain on rights and expectations
established under existing corporate law”).
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of stockholders created by substantive corporate law.199 Another way
to conceptualize which corporate law rights are fundamental is to
ask whether the provision impacts rights akin to private law or
public law, with the latter being a fundamental rights provision. For
example, issues implicating fiduciary duties serve a public law pur-
pose, while restrictions on dividends or preferred stock rights serve
a private law purpose.200 The public law nature of fundamental
rights provisions favors a first order interpretation goal of enforcing
the parties’ objective intentions in light of social welfare consider-
ations.201 The interpretive rules that best implement this goal can
be found in a contextualist theory of interpretation, because they
allow for examination of a much broader body of evidence and
policy.
A frequent objection to applying the contextual interpretive
approach is that it introduces cost and unpredictability by broaden-
ing the court’s inquiry into the context and circumstances surround-
ing the disputed language.202 Debates over a textual theory versus
contextual theory of interpretation highlight the advantages and
disadvantages of each. A textualist theory, given the limited uni-
verse of evidence allowed and ability to dispose of disputes on sum-
mary judgment, minimizes the cost of adjudicating a dispute at the
expense of accuracy.203 On the other hand, a contextualist theory
maximizes the likelihood of accuracy in interpretation, but with the
downside being a more costly process for both the parties and the
court, as well as increasing the chances of unpredictability.204 Where
the provision touches on fundamental corporate rights that are of a
public law nature, the need for an accurate interpretation outweighs
the attendant cost and unpredictability of a contextualist ap-
proach.205 This need is heightened in the context of Delaware cor-
porate law, where it is widely recognized that the courts’ decisions
199. See id. at 169; Winship, supra note 6, at 526-27 (proposing limits on corporate contract
procedure involving mandatory substantive corporate law). 
200. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 267-70.
201. See Coffee, supra note 132, at 1622; Cox, supra note 4, at 267-69; Joo, supra note 94,
at 798-99.
202. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1131-32; Geis, supra note 5, at 637 n.164.
203. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 930-31.
204. Id.
205. Cf. id. at 930 (“[A]lthough accurate judicial interpretations are desirable, accurate
interpretations are costly for parties and courts to obtain.”).
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reach well beyond the individual parties and influence corporate
and market behavior more broadly.206 Given the weight afforded to
Delaware’s judicial interpretations, accuracy becomes an even more
important factor.
The Third Circuit’s opinion in Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc.,207 provides a nice fact pattern to illustrate the impact
of analyzing a fundamental corporate rights provision under the
proposed interpretative framework. In Aleynikov, the Third Circuit,
applying Delaware law, was tasked with reconciling a contract
reading of Goldman Sachs Group’s (Goldman) bylaws with Dela-
ware’s pro-advancement policies.208 Specifically at issue was the
definition of “officer” in Goldman’s advancement bylaw provisions
and whether Sergey Aleynikov, who served as a vice president at
Goldman, Sachs & Co., a subsidiary of Goldman, was included in
that definition.209 The issue before the court highlighted the tension
between Delaware’s “strong public policy in favor of [advance-
ment]”210 and contract interpretation principles.
The majority in Aleynikov found that the term “officer” was
ambiguous and allowed the introduction of extrinsic evidence to
206. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). This of course assumes that the Delaware courts’ opinions
are accurately conveyed to the corporate community. See Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative
in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 848-
49, 852, 860.
207. 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
208. Id. at 353.
209. Id. Section 4.1 of Goldman’s bylaws, in relevant part, authorizes Goldman’s Board of
Directors to “elect [such officers as necessary, including] ... one or more Vice Presidents.”
Section 6.4 provides a specific advancement provision for officers of Goldman Sachs Group
subsidiary companies and states, defining, in relevant part, that
the term “officer,” ... when used with respect to a Subsidiary ... shall refer to any
person elected or appointed pursuant to the by-laws of such Subsidiary or other
enterprise or chosen in such manner as is prescribed by the by-laws ... [and]
shall include in addition to any officer of such entity, any person serving in a
similar capacity or as the manager of such entity.
Amended and Restated By-Laws of the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (amended and restated
as of May 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/000119312513237445/
d545345dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/JM3V-DK7K].
210. Stockman v. Heartland Indus. Partners, L.P., Nos. 4427-VCS, 4427-VCS, 2009 WL
2096213, at *18 n.75 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009) (quoting LeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., LLC, No.
Civ.A. 1384-N, 2006 WL 224058, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006)); see also Homestore, Inc. v.
Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211, 218 (Del. 2005).
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determine its meaning.211 At the same time, the court rejected
applying contra proferentem to the bylaw, stating that it would be
“inappropriate” to do so because the principle is employed to resolve
ambiguity with respect to the scope of advancement rights and not
whether an individual is entitled to advancement in the first
place.212 Ultimately, the court concluded that Aleynikov did not fall
within the definition of “officer” for purpose of advancement
rights.213
The dissent criticized the majority’s opinion for relying heavily on
the application of strict contract principles to the exclusion of the
relevant corporate doctrine overlay regarding advancement.214 Prior
Delaware cases had indicated that “[a]lthough courts use the tools
of contractual interpretation when construing bylaw provisions
relating to indemnification and advancement, they simultaneously
apply the patina of section 145’s policy.”215 As pointed out by the
dissent, the majority’s opinion misapplied not only Delaware’s
contractual jurisprudence, but also disregarded Delaware corporate
public policy surrounding advancement, which would have favored
application of contra proferentem to the bylaws.216 Indeed, the Del-
aware Chancery Court, in addressing a parallel suit for advance-
ment by Aleynikov, agreed with the dissent in its assessment.217
Noting that issue preclusion prevented Aleynikov from relitigating
the interpretation issues resolved in the prior decision, the court
nonetheless indicated in dicta that the Third Circuit had erred in
failing to apply the doctrine of contra proferentem as well as
“Delaware’s policy in favor of advancement and indemnification and
the resulting interpretive canon that, where reasonable, bylaws
should be read in favor of the existence of advancement and in-
demnification rights.”218
211. Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 362, 366-67.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 367.
214. See id. at 370-73 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
215. Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3003-CC, 2008 WL 868108, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 28, 2008); see also Sun-Times Media Grp. v. Black, 954 A.2d 380, 383 (Del. Ch.
2008).
216. Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 370-73 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
217. Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 10636-VCL, 2016 WL 3763246, at *3-7
(Del. Ch. July 13, 2016).
218. See id. at *6-7 (“Nevertheless, ‘issue preclusion prevent[s] relitigation of wrong
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Applying the proposed framework herein, the interpretation an-
alysis of “officer” in Aleynikov would follow the dissent and Court of
Chancery’s line of reasoning. Given Delaware’s strong policy in favor
of advancement and indemnification rights,219 coupled with the
court’s protection of officer’s and director’s reasonable expectations
of protection in the face of ambiguous language,220 advancement
provisions would be considered a fundamental right—that is, a right
that implicates the “rights and expectations established under
existing corporate law.”221 Accordingly, a contextual approach, al-
lowing for the consideration of a broad body of evidence, would be
appropriate. The Chancery Court’s dicta analysis in Aleynikov, in
fact, did just this by evaluating the following evidence: the bylaw
language itself; drafting history; the ordinary and plain meaning of
the language at issue; industry standards/trade usage; corporate
policy considerations; applicable state and federal government reg-
ulations; the conduct of the parties themselves; and the transaction-
al context.222 Taking into consideration this larger body of evidence
yields a different outcome than that reached by the Third Circuit.
Importantly, a broader, contextual analysis also allows for the court
to reinforce broader corporate welfare considerations, such as the
strong public policy in favor of advancement.223
3. Organizational “Boilerplate”
In their work, Professors Choi and Gulati observe that sophisti-
cated parties across different markets consistently engage in boiler-
plate contracting, where their contractual output consists of only
decisions just as much as right ones.’ Whether I agree or disagree with the Court of Appeals
is of no moment.” (quoting B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1308
(2015)).
219. See id. at *6; Stockman v. Heartland Indus. P’rs, L.P., C.A. No. 4227-VCS, 2009 WL
2096213, at *1 n.2 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009).
220. See Stockman, 2009 WL 2096213, at *5.
221. Hamermesh, supra note 119, at 172 (asserting that for consent considerations it is
important to ask whether the provision “place[s] too great a strain on rights and expectations
established under existing corporate law”).
222. Aleynikov, 2016 WL 3763246, at *3-7.
223. The Court of Chancery also noted that the Third Circuit’s interpretation analysis and
failure to apply “the doctrine of contra proferentem in this context has the potential to create
problems for advancement proceeds, which are supposed to be summary in nature.” Id. at *6.
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slight variations on the same set of boilerplate terms.224 Boilerplate
terms, they argue, often have systemic importance in the market,
thus necessitating both uniformity and accuracy in judicial interpre-
tation.225 Similar to boilerplate, certain provisions in public orga-
nizational documents have gained widespread acceptance and use.
For example, in 2003, before staggered boards began to fall out of
favor with stockholders, forty-four of the S&P 100 Companies had
such a provision.226 Comparing the staggered board provisions at
different corporations reveals only slight variations in the language
used, despite the fact that the corporations adopting such a pro-
vision may operate in different industries with different investor
bases and different financial profiles.227 Thus, classified board pro-
visions across all public corporations largely included the same set
of terms. In this regard, the staggered board has become “standard-
ized.”228
“Boilerplate” charter and bylaw provisions further parallel
contractual boilerplate with respect to the larger role they play in
the market. Organizational documents experience network effects,
learning benefits, and switching costs similar to boilerplate contract
224. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1130-33 (using sovereign debt contracts’s pari
passu clauses and the derivatives markets’ swap contracts as two case studies of commercial
boilerplate). Choi and Gulati note that “[l]arge portions of the markets for bonds and
derivatives are dominated by boilerplate.” Id. at 1130.
225. Id. at 1130-31.
226. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1008 (2010).
By 2009, only fifteen S&P Companies had a staggered board. Id.
227. The Delaware courts have recognized that there are two primary forms of classified
board language used in public corporations’ charters: (1) the “Annual Meeting Term Alter-
ative” providing for a class of directors to serve until the “annual meeting of stockholders to
be held in the third year following the year of their election,” and the (2) the “Defined Term
Alternative” providing for a class to serve a “term of three years.” See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010). Despite the variation in language employed,
the courts have found the provisions are intended to operate in the same manner. Id. at 1191-
95.
228. The standardization of terms in M&A agreements has also been well-documented. See,
e.g., THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS
317 (2009) ([“T]he basic architecture of any acquisition agreement follows a certain convention
regardless of the deal structure.”); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 257-62 (1984) (discussing the standard-
ization of the form of M&A agreements); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 11, at 718-29 (dis-
cussing standardization in corporate contracting). Standardization can also be found in poison
pills. Cf. Fisch, supra note 2, at 1638.
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terms.229 Because of these effects, scholars have observed “popula-
tion-level” learning230 in the development of corporate contracting:
“Corporations learn by transacting, both directly and vicariously.”231
Further, scholars have found corporations and their counsels quick
to react to and adjust corporate drafting practices to account for
judicial decisions.232 These actions indicate that a public corpora-
tion’s organizational documents have effects beyond that particular
entity. Corporate management, investors, regulators, banks, capital
markets, and other groups are sensitive to corporate governance
practices and the courts’ enforcement, interpretation, and general
commentary on those practices.233 Therefore, uniformity in the in-
terpretation of provisions that proliferate public corporate orga-
nizational documents is important because it enables the underlying
governance provisions to be priced into the corporation’s shares.234
Organizational documents thus have microeffects on the individual
firms as well as macroeffects in terms of their systemic importance
to capital markets and corporate governance expectations.
229. Cf. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 11, at 718-29 (discussing the “learning benefits,”
“network benefits,” and “switching costs” of using boilerplate contractual terms).
230. For a discussion of population-level learning, see Anne S. Miner & Philip Anderson,
Industry and Population-Level Learning: Organizational, Interorganizational, and Collective
Learning Processes, 16 ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT. 1 (1999); Anne S. Miner & Pamela R.
Haunschild, Population Level Learning, 17 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 115 (1995). 
231. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 174; see Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and
Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 214 (1950); Barbara Levitt & James G. March,
Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 319, 321 (1988); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden
King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009). 
232. See generally John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A
Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 336-37, 376, 384 (2000) (finding evidence
that lockup types and incidence in M&A transactions are sensitive to Delaware case law);
Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Deal Protection Devices: The Negotiation, Protection, and Enforce-
ment of M&A Transactions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 216
(Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (describing the back and forth between
the courts and corporate drafters in developing terms in M&A transactions).
233. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 170-71. 
234. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 16 (“The corporate venture has many
real contracts ... [including] the rules in force when the firm raises money ... the terms of
which affect the price of the [equity] issue.”). Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1130. But
see Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 657-58 (2016) (questioning the extent to which stock prices accurately
reflect the market’s valuation of governance arrangements); id. at 658-59 (positing that
inconsistent results regarding the price effect of governance provisions might be “due in part
to the well-known methodological problems associated with measuring the wealth effects of
corporate governance terms”).
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Given these similarities, Choi and Gulati’s work addressing the
role and interpretation of boilerplate is instructive. They argue that
applying a formalist approach in interpreting boilerplate imposes
large costs on even the most sophisticated parties.235 They explain:
[O]ver time, slight mutations in the precise language that
different actors have in their contracts often emerge—mutations
which may not have any particular meaning for the contracting
parties and that a court taking a textualist approach may attach
too great weight. Different boilerplate terms may get cobbled
together in the same contract, leading to potential inconsisten-
cies when interpreted through a purely textualist approach. The
chance for court error in interpreting boilerplate is therefore
high.236
A contextual approach, which broadens the universe of evidence
in an effort to determine the actual intentions of the specific parties,
is similarly not suitable. As Choi and Gulati explain:
Deference to the intentions of the specific parties before a court
is especially inappropriate where there are third party effects.
In the contexts on which we focus, an interpretation of the
contract language in one case will impact the contracts for a
multitude of other parties who all have essentially the same
boilerplate language in their contracts. Deferring to the inten-
tions of the parties to the dispute may produce problems where
these parties do not represent the interests of the others in the
market who have no say in the current litigation.237
Instead of a contractual interpretation analysis, Choi and Gulati
argue that judges should apply an analytical framework closer to
statutory analysis in interpreting boilerplate.238 Under a statutory-
like interpretive framework, courts would take a more historical
approach to the analysis by looking at the intent of the original
drafters, the overall history of a term, “the process by which the
235. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1130-31.
236. Id. at 1131.
237. Id. at 1132.
238. See id. at 1133. For a discussion of when the originalist, statutory interpretation
approach may be ill-suited for contract interpretation, see John F. Coyle, The Canons of
Construction for Choice of Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV. 631, 686-87 (2017).
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term became a standard ... in the industry,” and the greater com-
mercial environment.239 This interpretative framework accounts for
the fact that boilerplate provisions do not represent the specific
intentions of the parties; rather “[t]hey are more like incantations,
where the parties, by invoking the boilerplate language, avail
themselves of the historical reasons for the survival of these terms
in generations of contracts.”240 Given their strong similarities to
organizational documents in terms of development and policy con-
siderations, interpretation of organizational “boilerplate” should
likewise receive the statutory-like approach to interpretation pro-
posed by Choi and Gulati.
The decision in Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.,
nicely illustrates the considerations and proposed framework for
organizational “boilerplate.”241 In Airgas, the Delaware Supreme
Court addressed the validity of a stockholder-proposed bylaw that
would accelerate Airgas’s annual meeting by approximately eight
months.242 The validity of the bylaw turned on whether it was
inconsistent with the staggered board provision in Airgas’s charter
providing that directors’ terms would expire “at the annual meeting
of stockholders held in the third year following the year of their
election.”243 The court found the language at issue, which defined
the duration of the directors’ terms, to be ambiguous.244 Looking to
extrinsic evidence to construe that provision, the court found that
the language “has been understood to mean that the Airgas di-
rectors serve three year terms.”245 Accordingly, the court held that
the bylaw was invalid because it “prematurely terminate[d]” the
three-year terms of Airgas’s directors provided by statute and Air-
gas’s charter.246
The Airgas decision has been criticized as giving lip service to
corporate principles favoring the stockholder franchise while relying
239. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1131.
240. Id. at 1160.
241. See 8 A.3d 1182, 1184-85 (Del. 2010) (addressing the interpretation of ambiguous
language found in the corporate bylaws).
242. Id. at 1184. 
243. Id. at 1185.
244. See id. at 1189.
245. Id. at 1185.
246. Id.
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heavily on contract principles.247 While prior Delaware case law
provided for interpretation of ambiguous provisions in corporate
organizational documents in favor of the stockholder franchise
(which, as the lower court found, would have favored upholding the
stockholder-proposed bylaw), the Delaware Supreme Court ap-
peared to use a straightforward application of contract law princi-
ples to reach its conclusion.248 The outcome in Airgas has since been
explained as “strategic” decision-making by the court.249 A simpler
explanation, however, is that the staggered board provision was
organizational “boilerplate” and thus, under a statutory interpreta-
tion framework, the language at issue entitled directors to a three-
year term. 
At the time Airgas adopted its staggered board, such provisions
were common at many public corporations. As the court pointed out
in its opinion, there were two primary standardized forms of
staggered board provisions.250 While Air Products argued that the
differences between the two form provisions clearly indicated a con-
trary intent in how the staggered board would operate, the court
rejected such a formalist interpretation.251 Instead, the court relied
on the historical context in which staggered board provisions were
drafted and adopted, including the industry practice and under-
standing, and found that the slight mutations in the precise lan-
guage that different corporations used in their classified board
provisions was a distinction without a difference.252 Thus, while the
court did not state it was adopting a statutory-like interpretative
approach, that is in essence what it did. While the interpretation
framework for boilerplate provisions would not alter the outcome in
Airgas (indeed, it would come out the same), reference to the
proposed framework has the added benefit of providing clarity and
predictability to corporate actors and markets as to why and how
247. See generally Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value
of Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502.
248. See id. at 515.
249. See id. at 505, 534.
250. See supra note 227 (discussing the two primary forms of staggered board provisions
adopted by public corporations).
251. See Airgas, 8 A.3d at 1184-85.
252. See id. at 1189-95 (considering Delaware precedents, industry practice, model forms
and commentary, and other commentary in interpreting the classified board provision). 
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the court analyzes a particular provision, as opposed to the per-
ceived opacity of the court’s rationale that existed post-Airgas.
4. Novel Provisions
Corporate actors and their counsel are continually exploring new
avenues and structures for governance. Indeed, the phenomenon of
private ordering of public corporate governance is just the most
recent example of such innovation.253 Where the court projects that
a novel provision has the potential to be precedent setting, a con-
textual interpretive approach would be appropriate. Schwartz and
Scott, strong proponents of the textualist theory of interpretation,
acknowledge the value of a contextualist approach for these types
of terms: “When a correct interpretation is particularly important—
say the interpretation of a new contract that is expected to be widely
used—a party may prefer a court to hear all the available ev-
idence.”254 The desire for accuracy in determining the parties’ in-
tentions, as it relates to novel provisions, is consistent with the
statutory interpretation scheme for boilerplate provisions.255 Such
a scheme encourages courts to determine the original drafters’
intent and the historical context of the original drafters.256 The
analysis of a novel provision essentially predicts the provision’s
future evolution into boilerplate but is engaging in the analysis of
the intent and context of the original drafters from a real-time
perspective, for which contextual principles are appropriate, rather
than from a retrospective stance, for which statutory interpretation
principles are appropriate.
Forum selection clauses are a good illustration of a novel
provision.257 Prior to Boilermakers, where the court was asked to
address the validity of the forum selection clause, over 250 publicly
traded corporations had adopted such provisions.258 The widespread
253. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 1638.
254. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 946.
255. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 166, at 1131-32.
256. See id. at 1131.
257. An argument could also be made that forum selection clauses, given their impact on
stockholders’ right to sue, also implicate a fundamental corporate right triggering a contextual
approach to interpretation. 
258. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 944 (Del. Ch.
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adoption of forum selection provisions, even in the shadow of un-
certain enforceability, signaled their potential to become pervasive
in public corporate governance.259 Indeed, after Boilermakers, many
more corporations have adopted forum selection provisions.260 The
prevalence of forum selection provisions brings with it great poten-
tial to influence corporate governance norms, thus making accuracy
in interpreting their terms a top priority.
5. Individually Negotiated Provisions
Certain provisions in the charter and bylaws closely mimic the
traditional contract setting.261 These provisions are the product of a
more adversarial negotiating process and require individual agree-
ment with the corporation, thus more closely fitting the mutual as-
sent requirement in contract law.262 Further, the specific terms in
these provisions typically implicate private, individual, interests
within the corporation, as opposed to public interests. Accordingly,
this category of provisions would trigger the more tightly structured,
formalist textual interpretation principles Delaware applies in the
commercial context (for example, a hard parol evidence rule and the
plain meaning rule).
The most prominent example of an individually negotiated pro-
vision is a preferred stock designation.263 Because they deviate from
common stock rights, preferred stockholders’ rights, powers, and
preferences must be clearly and expressly stated in the instrument
2013).
259. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that companies comfortably adopted forum
selection provisions while awaiting a determination from the Delaware Supreme Court after
Boilermakers).
260. See id. (stating that, following Boilermakers, at least 112 Delaware corporations
adopted or announced plans to adopt such bylaws).
261. See Hamermesh, supra note 119, at 163.
262. Because of the limited number of actors that are typically parties to these provisions
and their agreement to all of the terms at the outset (which are also typically difficult to
amend without unanimous approval), preferred stock provisions do not trigger the same
consent concerns as provisions that impact the corporation and its stockholders more
generally. See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 119, at 164-65; Winship, supra note 6, at 497-49,
503.
263. Another example would be provisions governing the declaration and issuance of
dividends. 
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creating the preferred stock264—the preferred stock designation—
which is part of the corporate charter.265 In the public corporation
context, preferred stock is typically used to raise capital for the
corporation, and the specific terms of the stock are negotiated
between the investor(s) and the corporation.266 The resulting legal
relationship “thus strongly resembles the relationship among the
participants in what we might more readily describe as contractual
entities, like limited liability companies [or close corporations].”267
As an investor, a potential preferred stockholder can pursue its
rugged self-interest in negotiating the terms of its equity invest-
ment and exercise informed consent in agreeing to the terms of the
preferred stock rights, powers, and preferences set forth in the des-
ignation. This drafting and consent process most closely resembles
the formation of a commercial contract. As a result, straight ap-
plication of contract interpretation principles make sense. Further,
studies have found that sophisticated parties commonly prefer a
textualist interpretation in this context.268 The typical preferred
stockholder making a long-term investment in a public corporation
would be classified as a sophisticated business party. Thus, applying
Delaware’s traditional textualist approach in interpreting preferred
stock designations would be consistent with majoritarian prefer-
ences and expectations.
264. See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998).
265. See HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No. 12822, 1993 WL 205040, at *5
(Del. Ch. June 9, 1993).
266. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 48, at 1817-18; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response, Poor
Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 2025-26 (2013).
267. Strine et al., supra note 46, at 57.
268. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1511 (2009) (finding that parties chose the textualist New York
courts in choice of law and choice of forum clauses over the contextualist California courts);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining on the Red-Eye: New Light on Contract Theory (NYU Ctr. for
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-21, May 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1129805
[https://perma.cc/3SSV-A75N] (“The revealed preferences of sophisticated parties support
arguments by Schwartz, Scott and others that formalistic rules offer superior value for the
interpretation and enforcement of commercial contracts.”); see also Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 13, at 931-32; Robert E. Scott, Text Versus Context: The Failure of the Unitary Law of
Contract Interpretation, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 312, 312-35
(F.H. Buckley ed., 2013) (discussing the differences between textualist and contextualist
theories of contract interpretation and asserting that inefficiencies arise when contextualist
principles are applied in disputes between commercial entities). 
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Applying contract interpretation principles to preferred stock
designations is not a controversial proposal. Under Delaware law,
the rights of preferred stockholders are already viewed as primarily
contractual in nature.269 Recognizing that traditional contract prin-
ciples work well given the negotiated nature of the provisions, the
courts have characterized preferred stockholders as contractual
claimants and applied rules of contract construction in interpreting
the relevant charter provisions.270 As the preferred stock cases il-
lustrate, the proposed interpretation scheme for this subset of char-
ter provisions merely reinforces the analysis courts are already
undertaking, albeit in a more deliberate, explicit manner.
269. See Shintom Co., Ltd. v. Audiovox Corp., No. Civ.A. 693-N, 2005 WL 1138740, at *3
(Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (stating section 151 established that “the rights that a preferred
stockholder holds against the corporation are formed via contract, and the stockholder can
only claim those rights enunciated in the certificate”); GREGORY V. VARALLO, DANIEL A.
DREISBACH & BLAKE ROHRBACHER, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 57 (2d ed.
2009) (stating that the “rights and obligations of preferred shareholders are ‘essentially
contractual’”); Cox, supra note 4, at 273 (“Charter terms, therefore, were seen as contracts
with the preferred holders so that the preferred holders’ rights were determined from that
instrument’s four corners, and there was no application of fiduciary or equitable notions
extraneous to the charter.”); Strine et al., supra note 46, at 56-57 (“Even where a corporation’s
shares are publicly traded and widely held, moreover, there are disputes on matters of
internal corporate affairs that are also essentially contractual in nature, such as controversies
over the interpretation of the dividend, voting, or other rights of preferred stock. In these
cases, the courts have been explicit that principles applicable to contract interpretation in
general are equally applicable where the interpretational issue involves a provision of the
corporate charter or bylaws.” (internal citation omitted)).
270. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998); HB
Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 9,
1993); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986); Gaskill v.
Gladys Belle Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 339 (Del. Ch. 1929); see also Strine, supra note 266, at 2027-
28.
The Delaware courts’ analysis of preferred stock terms can appear at times to deviate from
the contractual approach. These cases, however, can be explained as a function of the equity-
contract characteristics of preferred stock:
[W]ith respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish
preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its directors is
essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is appropriately defined by
reference to the specific words evidencing that contract; where however the right
asserted is not to a preference as against the common stock but rather a right
shared equally with the common, the existence of such right and the scope of the
correlative duty maybe measured by equitable as well as legal standards.
Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 594; see also VARALLO ET AL., supra note 269, at 57; Strine, supra note
266, at 2027. 
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B. Benefits of an Explicit Framework
As the framework reveals, a corporation’s organizational docu-
ments are a rich combination of standardization, customization, and
innovation.271 This unique feature, however, demands a nuanced
interpretation scheme. The framework proposed here would
encourage courts to recognize explicitly the different parts of a
charter or bylaws and the different interpretation considerations
attendant to each. To the extent that courts are already engaging in
analysis similar to that offered here, the contract metaphor masks
the actual legwork that the court is performing. An explicit analysis
makes clear a broader interpretive scheme for organizational
documents and obliges courts to explain when they depart from that
scheme. For example, where after Airgas272 commentators and
scholars proffered several different theories for the court’s decision,
applying the above framework would resolve the perceived murki-
ness in the court’s rationale. The proposed framework thus provides
uniformity and predictability in interpretation, as well as transpar-
ency in the court’s interpretive analysis. This framework has the
benefit of signaling to the corporate community and other courts
which interpretation principles govern charter and bylaws provi-
sions.
The framework also retains space for the case-by-case analysis
and judicial discretion that is so integral to corporate law. Inevita-
bly, some provisions could be argued to fall into more than one
category (for example, a novel provision that implicates fundamen-
tal corporate rights).273 Where a provision could reasonably be
placed in more than one category, the court, exercising its discre-
tion, will need to assess the competing policy and normative
considerations and choose the proper classification. Moreover, the
framework is flexible; a provision’s categorization is not perma-
nently fixed. Rather, over time a provision may evolve such that it
migrates from one category to another (for example, when a novel
271. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 11, at 716 (explaining the balance of standardized,
customized, and innovative provisions in corporate contracts as a function of learning exter-
nalities and network externalities).
272. 8 A.3d 1182 (Del. 2010).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89, 257.
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provision becomes so standardized it is boilerplate). Again, when
and where a provision will transfer across categories will be a de-
termination for the court.
In sum, the proposed framework embraces two key features of
corporate law simultaneously: (1) case-by-case analysis, and (2) pre-
dictability. The framework achieves this through its requirement
that courts engage in a more explicit and tailored interpretation
analysis of organizational documents, yet still preserves significant
room for judicial discretion in applying the framework to any par-
ticular charter or bylaw provision.
CONCLUSION
The ex ante corporate governance movement has shown no signs
of slowing down. Stockholders, management, and their counsel will
continue to test the bounds of contractual flexibility in drafting
charter and bylaw amendments. As the courts develop a portfolio of
ex ante governance provisions that pass legal and equitable muster,
disputes will naturally progress to raising questions of interpreta-
tion.
Interpretation—in particular as applied to corporate organiza-
tional documents—has, to date, been largely overlooked by schol-
ars.274 Yet, the need for discourse and theorizing is great. In an era
of private ordering of public company governance, charter and bylaw
interpretation is poised to take on an influential role in shaping
corporate law and norms.
This Article seeks to provide a comprehensive interpretative
framework that takes into account the unique “contractual” insti-
tution that is a public corporation’s organizational documents.
Transactional law places a premium on stability and predictability
in the relevant legal constructs that will be applied. Corporate
management, investors, regulators, banks, capital markets, and
other groups are sensitive to corporate governance practices and the
courts’ enforcement, interpretation, and general commentary on
those practices.275 A public corporation’s organizational documents
274. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1581; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 928 (asserting
that scholarly commentary on contract interpretation is unhelpful and scarce).
275. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 170-71. 
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are especially sensitive to the need for stability and predictability
given factors such as the intended longevity of the documents; the
micro and macroeffects on individual firms and capital markets, re-
spectively, when there are shifts in drafters’ expectations regarding
interpretation and enforcement; and the difficulties in adapting
charters to post-adoption changes in the law.276 The framework
proposed in this Article provides uniformity and predictability in
interpretation while at the same time retaining flexibility and space
for judicial discretion. By requiring the courts to engage with the
proposed framework when deciding questions of interpretation, the
















Original drafter’s intent Statutory
Novel Provisions





Parties’ objective intent &
cost
Textualist
276. See Strine et al., supra note 46, at 57 (“More broadly, there is a widely held conception
of the corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts,’.... On this view of the corporation, the same
importance ascribed to consistent contract enforcement and clear judicial guidance to market
actors applies equally to the handling of disputes involving internal corporate affairs.”
(internal citation omitted)).
